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Reducing Risks in Wartime Through Capital-Labor Substitution: 
Evidence from World War II* 
 
Our research uses data from multiple archival sources to examine substitution among 
armored (tank-intensive), infantry (troop-intensive), and airborne (also troop-intensive) 
military units, as well as mid-war reorganizations of each type, to estimate the marginal cost 
of reducing U.S. fatalities in World War II, holding constant mission effectiveness, usage 
intensity, and task difficulty. If the government acted as though it equated marginal benefits 
and costs, the marginal cost figure measures the implicit value placed on soldiers’ lives. Our 
preferred estimates indicate that infantrymen’s lives were valued in 2009 dollars between $0 
and $0.5 million and armored troops’ lives were valued between $2 million and $6 million, 
relative to the efficient $1 million to $2 million 1940s-era private value of life. We find that the 
reorganizations of the armored and airborne divisions both increased efficiency, one by 
reducing costs with little increase in fatalities and the other by reducing fatalities with little 
increase in costs. 
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Governments spend large amounts each year to increase the safety and effectiveness of 
ground combat troops; however, little is known about the degree to which their expenditures 
translate into measureable improvements in survival or combat success. Our research uses data 
from multiple archival sources to understand the economics of ground combat and tradeoffs 
made by American military planners between expenditures and U.S. deaths in one important 
historical context –the Western Front of World War II (WWII). The cost per life saved is 
estimated and used to infer the dollar value that the U.S. government placed on avoiding military 
deaths and determine how that valuation compared with the private Value of a Statistical Life 
(VSL) at the time – citizens’ willingness to pay for reductions in fatality risk (Thaler and Rosen, 
1975; Viscusi, 1993, 1996). 
U.S. Army Ground Forces were organized into divisions, military units consisting of 
8,000 to 20,000 troops, that were infantry (troop-intensive), armored (tank-intensive), or airborne 
(paratrooper, also troop-intensive). In late 1943, Army policies reduced the size of the armored 
division and slightly reduced the size of the infantry division. In early 1945, another Army policy 
increased the size of the airborne division. Our research considers the effects of substitution 
across the different pre- and post-reorganization division types. Tank-intensive units were 
expensive in dollars, but troop-intensive units put more human targets on the battlefield; hence, 
an increase in tank-intensity would raise dollar costs and reduce fatalities. If the U.S. government 
acted as though it equated marginal benefits and marginal costs, the marginal cost per reduction 
in fatalities measures the implicit value the government placed on soldier’s lives.  
We compiled the data set we use from multiple sources, and it constitutes the most 
extensive set of quantitative information available on military operations in a single war. 
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Included are individual-level data on all 144,534 deaths to American ground divisions in WWII 
that were hand-typed from archival lists and combined with casualty rosters obtained from 
multiple government agencies. All Allied and Axis units’ movements come from campaign 
histories and historical atlases to identify terrain, geographical progress, and which Allied and 
Axis units met in combat. Another set of archival sources we compiled measure the costs of 
raising and operating different U.S. divisions in WWII. Finally, we also use data compiled by 
The Dupuy Institute from U.S. and German archival sources on both sides’ combat experiences 
for 162 engagements. 
 The results from our research indicate that, at the tank-intensity levels of the infantry and 
airborne divisions, the marginal cost in 2009 dollars per life saved by increasing tank intensity 
was $0.5 million or less, as compared to VSL estimates of $1 million to $2 million for young 
men in 1940 (Costa and Kahn, 2004). At the higher tank-intensity level of the armored division, 
we find a higher cost per life saved that is generally greater than $2 million. Thus, our results 
suggest that the U.S. government implicitly undervalued infantrymen’s lives and slightly 
overvalued armored personnel’s lives relative to the private value of citizens at the time. We find 
that the reorganization of the armored division increased efficiency by reducing dollar costs with 
little increase in fatalities and that the reorganization of the airborne division increased efficiency 
by generating a large reduction in fatalities at a low cost. 
 It is important to recognize that our research does not directly estimate the VSL for U.S. 
military personnel during WW II. It is more akin to the cost per life saved estimates used for 
various government regulations (Morrall III 2003). It is unclear whether military members at the 
time valued their lives differently in comparison to non-military workers. Given the widespread 
reach of the draft, it is likely that they were roughly the same. There does not appear to be any 
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previous research on estimating the VSL for WW II military personnel. As for other conflicts, 
Rohlfs (2012) estimates an upper bound on the VSL for military recruits during the Vietnam era 
and finds values ranging from $7 million to $12 million (in 2009 dollars). In addition, recent 
estimates from Greenstone et al. (2014) suggest that modern day military members tend to 
implicitly value their lives at levels lower than average citizens. Also, given the limited amount 
of applicable research, it is not entirely clear whether military members have traditionally been 
under- or over-valued by the U.S. government relative to private citizens. Recent estimates in 
Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013), for modern day warfare, suggest that the U.S. government likely 
over-values military members in comparison to average citizens for certain types of armament 
programs. Recent relative over-valuation of life saving in the military may or may not be the 
case historically, and our research provides context for issues related to the economics of 
military decisions where soldiers’ lives are at stake.1 
 
II. Key Institutional Factors 
After World War I, British military theorists advocated increasing the use of tanks to 
avoid the casualty-intensive stalemate of trench warfare (Fuller, 1928, pp. 106-151; Liddell Hart, 
1925, pp. 66-77; Wilson, 1998, pg. 120). The British theorists’ ideas were influential in the U.S. 
Army and in Congress (U.S. Congress, 1932, pg. 9932). However, the Army was slow to adopt 
tanks due to conservatism among high-ranking officers and Congressional budget cuts 
(Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, 1947, pp. 334-335; Steadman, 1982; Watson, 1950, pp. 15-50). 
                                                            
1 In addition to addressing the U.S. government’s implicit valuation of soldiers’ lives, our study adds to the tools 
available for empirical research in national defense. The WWII data used here describe a wide variety of combat 
situations and are unique among datasets from modern wars in that they include detailed first-hand information from 
both sides. Casualty forecasts using previously available WWII data have been more accurate than those based on 
less data-driven approaches (Economist, 2005), and the data and techniques we introduce here could help to further 





A. Determinants of Army-Wide Capital Intensity During World War II 
During the war, military procurement was constrained by the size of the U.S. economy 
and population (Smith, 1959, pp. 136; 154-158); however, the procurement process was driven 
more by planners’ perceived tradeoffs than by responses to immediate shortages (Harrison, 1988, 
pp. 181, 188-9). Constraints that the War Production Board imposed on materiel procurement 
were denominated in dollars and took into account “the needs of the civilian and industrial 
economy” (Smith, 1959, pg. 154-8). Most materiel purchases involved large contracts whose 
prices were monitored to curb war profiteering (Smith, 1959, pp. 216-412) but appear to have 
been somewhat higher than prices in the civilian economy.2 
As with equipment, troop procurement involved a variety of tradeoffs. The Army 
adjusted its new soldiers’ physical and intellectual competency requirements depending on the 
need for troops, and Congress restricted the drafting of 18-year-olds and fathers in response to 
public sympathy but varied draftee restrictions depending on the needs of the war effort 
(Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, 1947, pp. 246-251; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 1959, pp. 45, 85, 
201-207, 400). 
 
B. Division Types and the Reorganizations 
The division was the primary level at which U.S. Army Ground Forces were organized. 
Roughly two to four divisions comprised a corps, which was the next higher level of 
organization. Divisions from the same corps were rarely more than a few miles apart. Divisions’ 
                                                            
2 With all prices in 2009 dollars, in 1942, the Army paid $18,300 for a four-door sedan and $16,000 for a ¼-ton jeep 
(U.S. Army Service Forces, 1942). One source shows a new two-door sedan selling in the civilian economy in 1940 
for $11,300; comparable new and used cars sold in nearby years for similar prices. In 1935, a used half-ton pickup 
truck was selling for $7,300, and in 1956, a new jeep was selling for $10,800 (Morris County Library, 2009). 
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corps affiliations changed frequently over the course of the war, and a corps sometimes included 
divisions from multiple countries (Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, 1947, pg. 332; Kahn and 
McLemore, 1980, pp. 192-199). 
The Army sent 16 armored divisions, 47 infantry divisions, and 4 airborne divisions to 
the Western Front. Offensively, armor use could exploit penetrations generated by infantry and 
often operated behind enemy lines but required large amounts of gasoline and had difficulty on 
wet or rugged terrain. A wide set of both offensive and defensive operations used infantry, and 
airborne divisions parachuted behind enemy lines to disrupt communications and supplies and to 
initiate surprise attacks (Evans, 2002, pg. 49; Gabel, 1985a, pg. 4-6, 24; 1985b, pg. 4, 1986, pp. 
4, 8, 12, 23; Rottman, 2006, pp. 6, 24-7; Stanton, 1984, pg. 8, 11; Zaloga, 2007, pp. 9-12). 
Technological progress at the time allowed U.S. commanders to advance and maneuver 
their troops much faster during WW II than in previous wars. The degree of movement, however, 
was largely dictated by the terrain, combat environment, and unit capabilities. The initial entry of 
U.S. forces into the war began in November, 1942 in Algeria and Morocco. Units traveled east 
across Africa, up to Tunis and Sicily, and continued up the length of Italy for the duration of the 
war. Additional Allied units invaded Northern France in June 1944 and Southern France in 
August 1944, both traveling eastward to Germany. 
When the U.S. first entered the war, the number of troops in a standard infantry division 
was 15,514, and the number in a standard armored division was slightly lower, at 14,643; the 
armored division also included 390 tanks. The airborne division was first introduced in October 
1942 and included 8,505 troops, making it considerably smaller than the other division types. 
The actual numbers of troops and tanks in a division varied over time as subordinate units, such 
as regiments and battalions, were attached to and detached from different divisions. Attaching 
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units was more common than detaching them, so that the numbers of troops and tanks in a 
division tended to be larger than the standard levels. Troops and tank levels also varied due to the 
lag between combat losses and the arrival of replacement troops and equipment. 
In July 1943 the Army slightly reduced the size of the infantry division to 14,253. In 
September 1943 the Army reduced the troops and tanks in the armored division to 10,937 and 
263. In December 1944 the Army increased the number of troops in an airborne division to 
12,979 (Wilson, 1998, pp. 162-9, 183-5, 197). The new structures help identify the military’s 
implicit value of soldiers’ lives. 
All armored and infantry divisions that were raised after the reorganizations were given 
the new structure. All six infantry divisions already in the theater were reorganized in late 1943 
or early 1944. Of the three armored divisions that were already in the theater, the 1st was 
reorganized in June, 1944. The 2nd and 3rd were kept under the old structure to avoid disrupting 
their preparation for the D-Day invasion and were not reorganized until after the end of the war. 
The airborne reorganizations all took place on March 1, 1945. Of the four airborne divisions –the 
13th, 17th, 82nd, and 101st –that were sent to the Western Front, the attachments to the 82nd and 
101st were sufficiently large prior to the reorganization that they were effectively under the larger 
structure since the start of the war (Stanton, 1984, pp. 5-19; Wilson, 1998, pp. 182-96). 
 
III. Descriptive Results 
 The datasets we use here include a daily panel constructed by us and a team of research 
assistants. The data include information about the overseas experiences of every U.S. division 
sent to the Western Front and a sample obtained from The Dupuy Institute of a more detailed set 
of variables for 289 division days from 162 engagements between U.S. and German forces. In 
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addition, our research team compiled data from archival sources on the costs of raising and 
operating divisions of different types. Descriptions and summary statistics for all our datasets 
appear in the Appendix. 
 Figure 1 shows numbers of U.S. troops, tanks, estimated cost, and combat outcomes by 
division type. Panels A and B show actual troop and tank levels from the engagement data. 
Within each panel the left three bars are pre-reorganization levels and the right three bars are 
post-reorganization. The black bars correspond to armored divisions, the white bars to infantry 
divisions, and the gray bars to airborne divisions. The 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions are always 
treated as pre-reorganization, and the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions are always treated as 
post-reorganization. 
 As the engagement data illustrate, reorganization led to considerably smaller armored 
divisions. The reorganization reduced the typical armored division’s numbers of troops and tanks 
from 20,000 and 467 to 15,100 and 218. This was in stark contrast to the impact of the 
reorganization’s effect on the size of other division types. For instance, the reorganization 
appears to have had little impact on the size of infantry divisions. The engagement data do not 
include information on the size of the pre-reorganization airborne units. We do find, however (in 
results not shown), that the standard and authorized troop level data indicate that the 
reorganization led to considerably larger airborne divisions.  
 Panel C combines the per troop and per tank estimates from the cost data with the troop 
and tank levels from panels A and B to estimate the cost of a 10.8-month deployment by division 
type.3 From the engagement data, we find that the 1943-1944 armored reorganization reduced 
                                                            
3 Light, medium, and heavy tanks are all treated equally in the cost calculations. The U.S. Army increased its 
percentage of medium versus light tanks over the course of the war and introduced a heavy tank design near the end 
of the war (Stubbs and Connor, 1969, pp. 63-6). In the engagement data, considering light tanks separately from 
medium and heavy tanks has little effect on the estimates in this study, as shown in the Appendix. 
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the cost of an armored division from $5.14 billion to $2.93 billion ($2009) and that the infantry 
reorganization slightly increased the cost of an infantry division from $2.20 billion to $2.29 
billion ($2009) for a 10.8 month deployment. 
Panels D, E, and F present various measures illustrating how well U.S. troops performed 
in combat. Success measures include kilometers (km) of progress along the attacker’s axis of 
advance, U.S. killed in action (KIA), and a zero to one subjective index of mission success from 
The Dupuy Institute (2001b, 2005) for each of the division types. The differences between 
armored and infantry divisions in the panels suggest that armor was more effective than infantry 
in combat.4 The two best proxy measures that we use for “mission accomplishment” – km 
advanced and the mission success index –tend to be higher for the armored divisions than for 
infantry. Also of interest (in results not shown) is that task difficulty appears to have been higher 
for armored divisions as well. Although the number of troops in the opposing division was 
similar between pre-reorganization armor and infantry and somewhat lower for post-
reorganization armor, the number of tanks in the opposing division was considerably higher for 
armor in both cases. U.S. KIA is slightly higher for armor than for infantry, which could be 
attributable to higher task difficulty or usage intensity for armor. Despite the decrease in the 
armored division’s troops and tanks, we observe a slight increase in km of progress and little 
effect on U.S. KIA. We see a negative effect of the armored reorganization on the index of 
mission success in panel F, however, suggesting that mission effectiveness may have declined in 
a way that is not captured by geographical progress. For the infantry reorganization we observe 
slight increases in the mission success measure and in U.S. KIA.  
 Figure 2 illustrates the effects of the 1943-1944 reorganizations on usage in combat, 
geographical progress, and U.S. KIA in our second data set, the division by day panel. Panel A 
                                                            
4 Regression results that duplicate the information in Figures 1 and 2 appear in the Appendix. 
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shows the average number of Axis divisions in the same 0.25 x 0.25-coordinate (about 15 by 15 
mile) cell as the division, and panel B shows the fraction of division days with five or more U.S. 
KIA. Airborne divisions had relatively high rates of exposure to Axis divisions, and infantry 
divisions had high numbers of days with five or more U.S. KIA. According to both definitions of 
days of combat, the armored and airborne reorganizations came with decreases in combat days 
for the two division types, and the infantry reorganization came with an increase in combat days 
for the infantry division type. The changes in combat days are reflected in the outcome measures, 
km of progress and U.S. KIA, for the full sample in panels C and D. The armored reorganization 
is associated with a slight increase in progress and a large decrease in fatalities for the armored 
division type, a result that is consistent with a decline in days of combat or the difficulty of tasks 
for which the armored division was used. A similar and more pronounced pattern can be seen for 
the reorganization of the airborne division, a result consistent with a decline in combat days or 
task difficulty for the airborne division type as well. The opposite pattern can be seen for the 
infantry reorganization, which shows a decline in progress and an increase in KIA, a finding that 
is consistent with an increase in combat days or task difficulty for infantry.  
 Panels E and F show the same outcome variables as in panels C and D; however, the 
sample is restricted to days in which the U.S. division was in the same geographic cell as one or 
more Axis divisions. For the division days with nearby Axis units in panels E and F, progress is 
similar for armored and airborne and is slightly lower for infantry divisions. Also, for division 
days with nearby Axis units, the results show U.S. KIA is highest for airborne units, followed by 
infantry and armored units. The findings are consistent with armor having the highest combat 
effectiveness, followed by infantry, and finally by airborne; however, the results are also 
consistent with task difficulty being the lowest for armor and the highest for airborne.  
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Notably, we see little effect of the decrease in armored division resources on progress or 
KIA. Although this could indicate that the change in troop and tank levels had no effect on 
usefulness in combat, it is also consistent with simultaneous declines in the armored division’s 
usefulness in combat and the difficulty of tasks assigned to it. We see little effect of the infantry 
reorganization on progress or KIA during days of combat, which is unsurprising, given that the 
reorganization had little effect on the infantry division’s resources. For the airborne division the 
1943-1944 reorganization is associated with a slight decline in progress and a large decline in 
KIA. This is consistent with a decline in usage intensity of the airborne division and either an 
increase in combat effectiveness or a decrease in task difficulty.  
  
IV. Model 
We now present the conceptual framework to guide us in investigating observed 
differences among division types in costs, success, and fatalities and the implied government’s 
valuation of soldiers’ lives. The cost function model used here is adapted from Rohlfs (2006a). 
Consider a country (or government) waging a war with ܯ total missions or campaigns. For each 
mission ݉, the government observes a vector ܠܕ܏  of pre-determined correlates of task difficulty 
and selects one of ܵ unit organizational structures ݏ௠ and a usage intensity level ࣻ௠. For 
simplicity let the production functions for mission success ௠ܻ and own fatalities ܨ௠ be the linear 
functions 
(1) ௠ܻ ൌ ߙ௦೘௒ ൅ ߙ௒ࣻ ∗ ࣻ௠ ൅ ܠܕ܏ ′઺܇ ൅ ߝ௠௒ , and 
(2) ܨ௠ ൌ ߙ௦೘ி ൅ ߙிࣻ ∗ ࣻ௠ ൅ ܠܕ܏ ′઺۴ ൅ ߝ௠ி , 
where ߙ௦೘௒  and ߙ௦೘ி  are constant terms that are specific to organizational structure ݏ௠, and ߝ௠௒  
and ߝ௠ி  are error terms representing unobserved determinants of difficulty. 
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Organizational structure helps determine usage intensity, which the researcher does not 
observe. Let ࣻ௠ ൌ ߛ௦೘ ൅ ܠܕ܏ ′઺ࣻ denote the usage intensity that the country would select for 
structure ݏ௠ and vector ܠܕ܏ , a function that we take as linear. Suppose that ܠܕ܏  can be  
partitioned into vectors ܠܕܗ  and ܠܕܝ , where the researcher observes ܠܕܗ . Substituting, we obtain 
(1’) ௠ܻ ൌ ߙ௦೘∗௒ ൅ ܠܕܗ ′઺∗ܗ܇ ൅ ߝ௠∗௒, and 
(2’) ܨ௠ ൌ ߙ௦೘∗ி ൅ ܠܕܗ ′઺∗ܗ۴ ൅ ߝ௠∗ி, 
where ઺஺′ ൌ ሾ઺ܗ஺′ ઺ܝ஺′ሿ for each ܣ ∈ ሼࣻ, ܨ, ܻሽ, ߙ௦೘∗஺ ൌ ߙ௦೘஺ ൅ ߙ஺ࣻ ∗ ߛ௦೘, ઺∗ܗ஺ ൌ ઺ܗࣻ ൅ ઺ܗ஺,  
and ߝ௠∗஺ ൌ ߙ஺ࣻ ∗ ܠܕܝ ′઺ܝࣻ ൅ ܠܕܝ ᇱ઺ܝ஺ ൅ ߝ௠஺  for ܣ ∈ ሼܨ, ܻሽ. The coefficients ߙ௦೘∗௒  and ߙ௦೘∗ி  can be 
interpreted as the reduced-form effects of a change in organizational structure that include the 
direct effects of the physical inputs and the indirect effects of changing usage intensity.5 
The government’s/military’s utility here increases with ௠ܻ and decreases with ܨ௠ and 
dollar costs ܥ௠. It is convenient in the current setting to consider expected costs given expected 
levels of mission success and fatalities: 
(3) ܧൣܥ௠| തܻ, ܨത, ܠܕ܏ ൧ ൌ 	 ܧൣܥ௠|ܠܕ܏ ൧	 such that ܧൣ ௠ܻ|ܠܕ܏ ൧ ൒ തܻ and ܧൣܨ௠|ܠܕ܏ ൧ ൒ ܨത. 
Let ܥሚ௠൫ തܻ, ܨത, ܠܕ܏ ൯ denote the expected expenditure required to obtain expected threshold levels തܻ 
and ܨത of success and own fatalities. The total cost equation is analogous to the cost function in a 
producer’s problem that depends on prices and output. Although wages and capital prices do not 
vary across missions the vector ܠܕ܏  of correlates of task difficulty plays a similar role as prices. 
Mission success and fatalities can be viewed as two different products whose output levels enter 
into the government’s objective function. Let ௠ܲ and ܸ equal the marginal values to the 
                                                            
5 Strictly speaking, because the two production functions are initially simplified to be linear the subsequent cost 
function will also be linear so that the two marginal costs are constants, and there is no unique dual outcome cost 
minimum. The consequence is that the levels of mission success and fatalities will be determined by their marginal 
values to the military decision maker. We explore possible non-linear cost functions empirically in Section V. 
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government of a unit of expected success and a unit reduction in expected fatalities. ܸ is the 
parameter of our empirical interest and is assumed constant across missions. The first-order 
conditions of the military’s optimization are ௠ܲ ൌ ܧ ൤డ஼ሚ೘൫௒ത,ிത,ܠܕ
܏ ൯
డ௒ത ൨ and ܸ ൌ െܧ ൤
డ஼ሚ೘൫௒ത,ிത,ܠܕ܏ ൯
డிത ൨. 
ܥሚ௠ሺ. , . , . ሻ is linear here and is then 
(4) ܥሚ௠ ൌ ௠ܲ ∗ ܧൣ ௠ܻ|ܠܕ܏ ൧ െ ܸ ∗ ܧൣܨ௠|ܠܕ܏ ൧ ൅ ܠܕ܏ ′઺஼ሚ ൅ ߝ௠஼ሚ , 
where ઺஼ሚ′ ൌ ൣ઺ܗ஼ሚ′ ઺ܝ஼ሚ′൧. Neither ܧൣ ௠ܻ|ܠܕ܏ ൧ nor ܧൣܨ௠|ܠܕ܏ ൧ is observed by the researcher; 
however, substituting Equations (1’) and (2’) into Equation (4), we obtain: 
(4’) ܥሚ௠ ൌ തܲ ∗ ௠ܻ െ ܸ ∗ ܨ௠ ൅ ܠܕܗ ′઺ܗ஼ሚ ൅ ߝ௠∗஼ሚ, 
where തܲ ൌ ଵெ∑ ௠ܲெ௠ୀଵ  and ߝ௠∗஼ሚ ൌ ሺ ௠ܲ െ തܲሻ ∗ ௠ܻ ൅ ܠܕܝ ᇱ઺ܝ஼ሚ ൅ ߝ௠஼ሚ െ ௠ܲ ∗ ߝ௠௒ ൅ ܸ ∗ ߝ௠ி . Note that 
we do not allow usage intensity ࣻ௠ to affect costs directly,which may lead to an upward bias in 
the estimation of ܸ; however, the bias is probably not very large.6 
Both ௠ܻ and ܨ௠ are endogenous variables that are correlated with components of ߝ௠∗஼ሚ, 
such as ௠ܲ, ߝ௠௒ , and ߝ௠ி . Hence, ܸ cannot be consistently estimated with an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression of Equation (4’).7 Instead we use a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
strategy in which ௠ܻ and ܨ௠ are endogenous regressors whose values are predicted using 
equations (1’) and (2’) as first-stage regressions with indicators for the different organizational 
structures as excluded instruments. 
                                                            
6 Higher levels of ࣻ௠ probably led to higher ammunition costs and capital losses. However, the cost data take into 
account differences across division types in ammunition usage and tank losses; hence, the cost differences will be 
reflected in the comparisons across division types. Depreciation of capital other than tanks was a relatively minor 
cost, making up only 3 per cent and 4 per cent of the costs of the 1942 standard infantry and armored divisions. 
Hence, the largest differences in equipment losses among division types are accounted for in our regressions. 
7 In particular, OLS estimates of the marginal costs of mission success and fatality reductions will be biased toward 
zero because shocks to the cost structure will lead to choosing fewer, shorter missions (less success) and fewer 
soldier safety measures (more fatalities) if the two outcomes are endogenous in (4’). 
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For the coefficients in Equation (4’) to have a structural interpretation, it is essential that 
organizational structure ݏ௠ is a choice variable that is endogenous to the model. Thus, the 
estimation strategy proposed here uses instruments that are not exogenous. Instead, we impose 
the weaker assumption of conditional exogeneity that, after controlling for ܠܕܗ , the organizational 
structure indicators are uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of task difficulty, and ௠ܲ, the 
importance of the mission. Hence, none of the division types can have been used more than 
others in tasks that were especially difficult in some unobservable way. 
The main defense for imposing the conditional exogeneity assumption is that both the 
division by day panel and the engagement data include many control variables, among them 
detailed descriptors of enemy characteristics. Additionally, the sequential nature of the 
geographic targets limited the degree to which the Army could pick certain division types for 
certain tasks. Although Army doctrine recommended using each division type for a specific type 
of task, the main differences across tasks were the numbers and types of nearby ally and enemy 
units, factors that appear in ܠܕܗ . Some of our econometric specifications focus on within-division 
variation in organizational structure and control for U.S. division fixed effects, an approach that 
provides an even stronger way to control for battlefield strategy effects. Nevertheless, we note 
that the need for control variables and the possibility that the controls are incomplete represent 
limitations to our study. 
One advantage of the 2SLS procedure here is that it combines the results from multiple 
margins of adjustment into a single measure of the rate at which the government made tradeoffs 
between dollars and U.S. fatalities. The procedure also has the unfortunate feature that it lacks 
transparency. To address improve transparency, we present the first-stage and reduced-form 
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regressions in graphical form to illustrate the separate roles of each of the division types in the 
final estimates, and we present the 2SLS results separately for different sets of divisions.8 
 
A. Strategy and Endogenous Enemy Characteristics 
We include enemy units’ characteristics in the set of controls, but the model does not 
allow enemy units’ characteristics to respond to the U.S. unit’s division type or usage intensity. 
For the division by day panel, the enemy unit assumption is probably reasonable. The division by 
day panel dataset’s controls for enemy characteristics come from information on long-range 
movements. The measures of enemy locations probably responded to large-scale events such as 
the success of the overall war effort; however, they are too coarse to detect responses to a single 
U.S. unit’s division type. 
In the engagement data the controls for enemy characteristics include enemy troops, 
tanks, aerial sorties, and in some cases, Axis division fixed effects. At the division level, 
attacking units had the ability to choose their opponents; however, the U.S. was the attacker in 
90 per cent of the combat days considered. The primary way that a defending force could 
respond is through retreat or withdrawal, actions that are treated as endogenous and are not 
included in the controls. So, for a given engagement it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
U.S. treated the German force’s starting troop and tank levels as fixed quantities that did not 
                                                            
8 The focus of our 2SLS approach is not the variation in the dependent variable but instead as a way to combine the 
various reduced-form coefficients into a summary measure of cost per life saved. In the just identified case where 
the sample includes only three division types and only two organizational structure indicators appear in the set of 
excluded instruments, the 2SLS procedure here is identical to measuring the effects of a weighted sum of the two 
policies (switching from type one to type two and partially switching from type two to type three), where the second 
policy is implemented in the exact proportion necessary to hold mission accomplishment constant. In our context, ܸ 
is the estimated effect of the weighted sum of policies on dollar costs divided by the effect on fatalities. (See Rohlfs 
(2006b) and the Appendix.) 
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respond to the attacking unit’s division type.9 German troops and tanks may have responded to 
American organizational structure for the one per cent of cases in which the German unit was the 
attacker, and German air sorties may have responded in the 17 per cent of cases in which there 
was German air support. Dropping observations with possible German responses to U.S. actions 
has little effect on the estimates, as does dropping the Axis inputs from the set of controls (results 
shown in the Appendix). 
In some cases, a unit’s actions in one engagement could generate benefits to other 
engagements. For instance, a U.S. unit’s success could reduce the task difficulty for the next 
Allied unit facing the same enemy. In the current framework the government’s value ௠ܲ of the 
mission meters subsequent benefits to other U.S. units. Treating enemy characteristics as pre-
determined correlates of task difficulty in ܠܕܗ  helps to avoid double-counting of benefits in other 
engagements. 
 
B. Spillover Effects of Nearby Units 
 Because multiple divisions usually traveled together as a corps, a given Allied division 
probably had spillover effects on the geographical progress of other nearby Allied divisions. The 
main specifications address spillover effects by including the numbers of nearby divisions of 
different types as control variables in the regressions. Hence, the benefits of the positive 
spillovers generated by a unit, while valued by the country, are not counted in the mission 
effectiveness of the unit. An alternative formulation that takes benefits into account is to model 
progress as a corps-by-day level phenomenon and to estimate Equation (4’) at the higher level of 
                                                            
9 Troop and tank levels in the engagement data measure the military strengths at the start of each engagement. If 
significant reinforcements arrived, the data treat this as two engagements, one before the reinforcements arrived and 
one after the reinforcements arrived (Dupuy, 1987, pg. 65). 
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aggregation. Estimates using the corps level approach appear in the Appendix and, while less 
precise, yield generally similar results to results presented. 
 
C. Troop and Tank Regressions 
One alternative formulation of the first-stage equations used in some of the specifications 
replaces the organizational structure indicators with continuous regressors measuring the 
numbers of troops and tanks of the U.S. unit together with their interaction. Implementing the 
troop-tank interaction approach involves the following substitutions into Equations (1’) and (2’): 
(5) ߙ௦೘∗஺ ൌ ߙ்௥௢௢௣௦∗஺ ∗ ܶݎ݋݋݌ݏ௠ ൅ ߙ்௔௡௞௦∗஺ ∗ ܶܽ݊݇ݏ௠ ൅ ߙ்்∗஺ ∗ ܶݎ݋݋݌ݏ௠ ∗ ܶܽ݊݇ݏ௠, 
for ܣ ∈ ሼܨ, ܻሽ. The approach summarized in (5) is in some formulations involving the 
engagement data, for which there are direct measures of U.S. troops and tanks, and it is the one 
used by Rohlfs (2006a, 2006b). The procedure has the disadvantages that many of the cross-
sectional differences in U.S. troops and tanks reflect differences in attachments or detachments 
(which the Army could change quickly depending on the needs of a given mission) or recent 
combat losses, increasing the likelihood that the differences are caused by unobserved 
determinants of mission difficulty. The equation (5) approach has the advantage, however, that it 
can be implemented with U.S. and Axis division fixed effects together with the full set of 
controls from the engagement data. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
 We now present our main empirical findings. First, we show estimates from Equations 
(1’) and (2’) in such a way as to illustrate how the estimated cost per life saved varies across 
different policies and regression specifications. Due to the large number of pre- and post-
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reorganization division types and the complex interactions between combat effectiveness and 
usage intensity, the first-stage regressions of Equations (1’) and (2’) are cumbersome to present 
in tabular form. So, for simplicity the first-stage estimates appear graphically in Figure 3. The 
corresponding regression tables appear in the Appendix. 
 
A. Graphical Summaries 
In Figure 3 the variables that we treat as exogenous are division type (Armored, Infantry, 
or Airborne) and pre-post reorganization during 1943-1944. The combination of the two 
organization variables sorts the data into six or fewer distinct groups, depending upon data 
availability, which varies across the graphs shown. Each of the unit types had a certain cost, a 
certain rate of fatalities, and a certain level of mission accomplishment, which vary by model and 
which explain the existence of the eight different graphs. 
The axes of the graphs in Figure 3 show only two dimensions, cost and fatalities, which 
we plot along the vertical and horizontal axes,. To illustrate the third dimension, mission success, 
in a way that is easily identifiable for readers, we plot the dashed isoquant curves shown. The 
curves are hand-drawn -- they are not the result of an estimation process -- and they are 
generated to be consistent with the ordering of the mission accomplishment levels achieved by 
the different unit types shown on the graph. Each of the resulting curves is the simplest, 
smoothest one that we could draw given the ordering of mission accomplishment levels observed 
in the data across the six or fewer points. 
Within each of the eight panels in Figure 3 the estimated dollar cost of a 10.8-month 
deployment of that division type appears on the vertical axis. The cost estimates are the same as 
in Figure 1. We use the European Theater of Operations (ETO) costs in panels A through D and 
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G and H.10 The costs for the actual troop and tank levels appearing in panels E and F are also the 
same as in Figure 1. The estimated number of fatalities that the division would incur over that 
10.8 months appears on the horizontal axis. The average levels of mission success as shown in 
the isoquants are predicted values by division type from Equation (1’), where the control 
variables are set equal to the averages over the sample being used. The isoquants show 
alternative combinations of dollar costs and U.S. fatalities that generate equivalent levels of 
mission effectiveness. Division types on the upper left of the graph were expensive in dollars but 
experienced few fatalities. Moving downward and to the right along an isoquant the dollar cost 
of the unit decreases. To maintain the same level of effectiveness, usage intensity increases, 
leading to higher numbers of fatalities. The slope of the curve is an estimate of the rate of 
tradeoff between expenditures and fatalities. In some cases, the curves could be steeper or flatter 
and still agree with the observed levels of success; however, the range of possible slopes is fairly 
narrow at many key points on the graphs. 
Although the slopes of the isoquants in Figure 3 are not the result of a formal estimation 
process the placement of the different points in terms of cost, fatalities, and mission 
accomplishment is surprisingly restrictive in terms of what the isoquants might look like. In 
panels A, B, and C, for instance, any isoquant that is consistent with the data must have a steep 
portion in the upper left part of the graph (to match the ordering of the two black points) and a 
flat portion in the lower right-hand part (to match the ordering of the two gray points). 
To estimate fatalities we first computed predicted values from Equation (2’), where U.S. 
KIA is the dependent variable and the control variables are set to their sample averages. For the 
regressions using the division by day panel, total estimated KIA for a 10.8-month deployment 
                                                            
10 The estimated cost for pre-reorganization infantry, which is missing in Figure 1, assumes that the percentage 
change in costs generated by the infantry reorganization was the same as in the engagement data. Additional 
information on the ETO costs presented in Figure 3 appears in the Appendix. 
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comes from multiplying predicted KIA per combat day by the average division’s number of 
combat days and dividing by the fraction of U.S. KIA that occurred on the combat days. To 
convert from KIA to fatalities, we divided the 10.8-month KIA totals by 0.84, the fraction of 
U.S. deaths that were KIA. Hence, a division type’s fatalities over the deployment are taken as 
proportional to KIA for that division type on an average combat day. 
Panels A through D show results from the division by day longitudinal data; panels A and 
B use the sample of division days with nearby Axis divisions, and panels C and D use the sample 
of division days with five or more U.S. KIA. Panels E through H show results from the 
engagement data. In panels G and H, the averages by division type use the coefficients from the 
troop and tank regressions, substituting in the average troop and tank numbers from the ETO 
data. The measure of mission success is km progress in panels A through D and the index of 
mission accomplishment in panels E through H. Panels A, C, E, and G use no control variables. 
Hence, for panels A, C, and E, the fatalities estimates are scaled versions of the KIA averages 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, and the mission effectiveness estimates used to generate the dashed 
lines are also taken from Figures 1 and 2. Panels B and D show conditional means estimated 
from regressions that control for date and continent, numbers of nearby Allied and Axis 
divisions, terrain, vegetation, weather, and combat experience; panels F and H control for date 
and continent, U.S. aerial sorties, enemy inputs, terrain, vegetation, weather, and human factors. 
The control variables just described are listed in the footnotes to Tables 1 and 2. 
 When the data are sufficiently informative in Figure 3 to determine the cost per life 
saved, as measured by the slope of the isoquant, it tends to be highest at the higher cost levels, 
with a generally steeper tradeoff than the efficient rate of $1 million to $2 million dollars per life. 
At the lower cost levels the cost per life saved tends to be lowest and flatter than the efficient rate 
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just mentioned. In each of panels A, C, and E, dollar costs are highest for the armored divisions, 
and fatalities are highest for the airborne divisions. The isoquants are roughly convex in all three 
panels, with kinks around the middle expenditure levels in panels A and E and a backward-
bending portion for the armored divisions in panel C. At the highest two cost levels in panel A, 
the average slope between the cost levels of the pre- and post-reorganization armored divisions 
on the highest isoquant is about –$3 million per life. On the same isoquant in panel A the slope 
between the lowest cost levels of the pre- and post-reorganization airborne divisions is 
approximately –$0.5 million per life. On the highest isoquant drawn on panel C, the slope 
between the cost levels of the pre- and post-reorganization armored divisions is roughly +$2 
million per life. The curve flattens to about –$1 million per life between the cost level of the 
post-reorganization armored and the fatality level of the infantry division. Although the slope is 
unclear at lower cost levels the curve is necessarily flatter than the roughly –$0.9 million per life 
slope between the infantry divisions and the post-reorganization airborne division, which is on a 
lower isoquant. On the highest isoquant in panel E, the average slope between the cost level of 
the pre-reorganization armored division and the fatality level of the post-reorganization airborne 
division is about –$0.7 million per life. When the troop and tank regressions are used in panel G, 
many slopes are possible, and the data are fairly uninformative about the tradeoffs between 
expenditures and U.S. fatalities. 
When we add controls to the regression for the sample with nearby Axis divisions in 
panel B, the slope steepens. On the second-highest isoquant in panel B the average slope 
between the cost levels of the pre- and post-reorganization armored divisions is about –$6 
million per life. On the highest isoquant in panel B the average slope between the fatality levels 
of the pre-reorganization armored and the post-reorganization airborne divisions is about –$1 
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million per life. For the sample of division days with five or more U.S. KIA, adding controls in 
panel D generates isoquants that are not consistent with a government that values mission 
success. When controls are added to the engagement data in panels F and H, we observe 
relatively flat slopes. In panels F and H the slopes of the isoquants between the fatality levels of 
the pre-reorganization armored and the pre-reorganization infantry divisions are not explicitly 
determined but are necessarily less than –$0.4 million and –$0.6 million per life, respectively. 
 
B. Regression Results 
 Before presenting our cost function regression estimates it is important to emphasize the 
relative advantages of the two different data sets we use. The benefit of the engagement data is 
the quality of the measurements. Everything comes from detailed first-hand accounts, and we 
know how many people were on the battlefield on both sides, how much equipment they had, 
how many died, and we have a good metric for mission accomplishment. The downsides of the 
engagement-level data are selection bias and omitted variables bias – we only observe battles 
that were big enough to matter for U.S. divisions that were important in the war effort, and we 
don’t have strong instruments for troop and tank use so we are left assuming that they are 
exogenous. 
 The benefits of the division-level data are exactly where the engagement-level data are 
lacking. We have instruments for troop and tank numbers (the reorganization policy), and we 
have a large and complete sample of all the engagements between U.S. and Axis forces. The 
disadvantages are the quality of the measurements. We have rough measures of U.S. division 
movements, which involve interpolations to estimate where each division was (and consequently 
distance moved, terrain, weather, and locations of enemy forces). Counting numbers of fatalities 
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involves matching individual soldiers to dates of death, which are missing for some individuals 
and has some inconsistencies. However, the main measurement error problems in the division-
level data should be mitigated by the instrumental variables approach we use because the most 
important sources of measurement errors are in the endogenous variables. Finally, the value that 
the government placed on soldiers’ lives is best estimated by looking at the full sample of 
fatalities in the division level data and not in the most important and high-profile engagements. 
 In addition to presenting in Tables 1 and 2 our cost function parameter estimates of the 
marginal costs of the two endogenous variables, mission success and soldiers’ fatalities, we 
tabulate typical accompanying indicators of the models’ instrument strengths and the degree with 
which the models’ identifying instruments may be considered exogenous.11 Considering 
instrument strength, there is no unique critical value for the partial F statistics for the excluded 
(identifying) instruments, rather a guiding principle that a higher F is better (Angrist and Pischke 
2009). However, as Greene (2012, p. 250) notes, the instrument strength check is neither a 
specification test nor is it a constructive test for model building, but instead a strategy that helps 
the researcher avoid possibly basing inference on unreliable statistics. Concerning whether the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid, we also note that lower Chi squares are better. However, 
formal overidentifying restrictions tests can be misleading because the empirical validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions is neither sufficient nor necessary for the validity of the moment 
conditions implied by the underlying model and in turn provide little or no information on the 
identification of parameters of interest (Deaton 2010, Parente and Santos Silva 2012). 
We now turn to our 2SLS estimates of തܲ and ܸ from Equation (4’). 
                                                            
11 We do not tabulate Hausman-Wu statistics of endogeneity of Y and F because our results uniformly reject 
exogeneity (equality of OLS and 2SLS estimates of the marginal costs in (4’)). See footnote 14 for a numerical 
example of the difference. 
24 
 
Division Data Results. Table 1 shows the 2SLS results for the division by day 
longitudinal data set. Within each of the two panels in the Table, a column shows results from a 
distinct 2SLS regression of Equation (4’), where the dependent variable is cost per combat day, 
the endogenous regressors are geographic progress and U.S. fatalities, and the excluded 
instruments are indicators for the different pre- and post-reorganization division types.12 To 
construct daily fatalities, we divide U.S. KIA by the product of the fraction of U.S. KIA that 
occurred on combat days and the fraction of U.S. fatalities that were KIA. The coefficient on 
progress can be interpreted as the U.S. government’s valuation (marginal cost) of one km of 
progress in a typical combat day, and the coefficient on U.S. fatalities can be interpreted as 
negative one times the U.S. government’s valuation (marginal cost) of one fatality reduction.13 
In panel A of Table 1, the sample includes division days in which the U.S. division was 
in the same cell as one or more Axis divisions; in panel B, the sample includes division days in 
which U.S. KIA was five or more. The first three columns show results from the full sample of 
combat days, and columns (4) and (5) present results from the fixed effects samples. Column (1) 
shows results controlling for a time trend and continent fixed effects. Column (2) includes the 
full set of additional controls, and columns (3) and (4) add fixed effects for month x year, nearby 
Axis divisions, and 0.25 x 0.25-coordinate geographic cells. Relative to Figure 3, the regressions 
in columns (1) to (4) of Table 1 impose a constant slope on the isoquants and constant growth in 
mission effectiveness per dollar of expenditure from one isoquant to another. The regressions in 
column (5) control for U.S. division fixed effects, so that the indicators for armored and airborne 
                                                            
12 As an indication of bias from ignoring endogeneity of Y and F in (4’) their coefficients each shrink by 99 percent 
in absolute value if we use OLS to estimate the first regression in Table 1, for example. 
13 As noted earlier the basic estimating equation is linear in F and Y so that there are constant marginal costs. We 
explored the empirical validity of the linear cost function in (4’) by including endogenous quadratics in progress and 
fatalities (Y2 and F2) or by including an endogenous interaction term (YF) with no empirical success in finding non-
constant marginal costs. 
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appear in the controls and the coefficients of interest are identified from variation generated by 
the reorganizations. The remaining columns of Table 1 apply varying restrictions to the sample 
so that different combinations of the instruments identify the coefficients of interest. In each case 
the regressions that controls for continent and a daily time trend are in the first column, while  
regressions with controls for month x year, Axis divisions, and cell fixed effects are in 
subsequent columns. We use standard errors clustered by U.S. division by year by month 
interaction, which are in parentheses (Cameron and Miller 2015).14 
In columns (1) to (4) of Table 1 the coefficients on km progress are unstable and change 
signs across specifications in both panels. Hence, we do not find a consistent positive marginal 
cost of increasing mission success, possibly due to the combined imprecision of the first-stage 
progress measure and the linear specification. The U.S. fatality coefficients in columns (1), (2), 
(3), and (4) in panel A are -1.436, -1.926, -0.476, and -0.408. All four fatality coefficients are 
more than twice the value of their standard errors, respectively. This is in contrast to the first four 
columns in panel B, where only the U.S. fatality coefficient in column (3) is more than 1.68 
times larger than its standard error. In columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) of panel B the fatality 
coefficients are -0.711, -4.673, -2.521, and -3.197. Thus, the marginal cost per life saved 
estimates in columns (1) to (4) in panels A and B range in value from $0.41 million to $2.5 
million, with average and median estimates of $1.9 million and $1.7 million per life. The larger 
estimates are from regressions with negative coefficients on km progress, a result suggesting that 
the regressions with the higher cost per life saved do not adequately control for the mission 
effectiveness of the unit. 
                                                            
14 The standard errors do not take into account any imprecision in the constructed dollar cost measures. Some serial 
correlation also probably exists between divisions and between days from different months. The smaller clusters 
used make the model estimable with the full set of controls and fixed effects. When we use fewer covariates, using 
fewer clusters in both datasets has little effect on the standard errors, as shown in the Appendix. 
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When we add U.S. division fixed effects, as in the regressions in column (5), the 
coefficient on progress is positive in panel A and zero in panel B, and the estimated costs per life 
saved are $0.3 million and $0.4 million. With the sample restrictions applied in columns (6) to 
(15), the coefficients on U.S. fatalities are negative in 18, more than twice the value of their 
standard errors in four, and more than 1.68 times larger (but less than two times larger) than the 
value of their standard errors in three of the 20 specifications. The estimated cost per life saved 
tends to be larger in panel B, with average and median values of $2.8 million and $1.3 million, 
than in panel A, with average and median values of $1.3 million and $1.2 million. The 
coefficient on km progress tends to be positive in the sample with nearby Axis divisions in panel 
A and negative in the sample with five or more U.S. KIA in panel B; hence, the larger estimated 
cost per life saved in panel B is probably attributable to the regressions failing to adequately 
control for the policies’ effects on mission accomplishment. When considering tradeoffs between 
armored and either of the other two division types the cost per life saved estimates in panel A 
range from $0.5 million to $1.5 million. The estimated cost per life saved is considerably lower, 
ranging from zero to $0.3 million, when the sample is restricted to infantry and airborne 
divisions, and the coefficient on km progress is negative in three out of four specifications. In 
columns (12) to (15), we find comparable cost per life saved estimates pre- and post-
reorganization. The cost per life saved estimates are also generally smaller in the specifications 
that include the month by year, Axis division, and geographic cell fixed effects. 
 Engagement Data Results. Table 2 shows 2SLS estimates of Equation (4’) from the 
engagement data. In panel A, mission success is km of progress along the attacker’s axis of 
advance, and in panel B, mission success uses the subjective index. Within each panel, each 
column shows results from a different regression specification. In columns (1) through (5) the 
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sample excludes the airborne observations, and the excluded instruments are three indicators for 
division type (armored, post-reorganization times armored, and post-reorganization times 
infantry).15  In columns (6) to (15), the excluded instruments are U.S. troops, U.S. tanks, and 
their interaction. 
 The coefficient on mission effectiveness is more consistently positive in Table 2 than in 
Table 1, probably due to the greater precision of the effectiveness measures in the engagement 
data. The specifications that use the success index in panel B have the most consistently positive 
and precisely estimated coefficients on mission effectiveness, a result that suggests that the 
specifications more effectively control for mission success than do the specifications in panel A. 
The coefficients on the success index is positive in 14, more than twice their respective standard 
errors in six, and more than 1.68 times larger (but less than two times larger) than their standard 
errors in three of the specifications. The coefficient on km progress tends to be larger in Table 2 
than in Table 1, because the engagement sample includes fewer combat days, and unlike U.S. 
fatalities the mission success measures are not scaled upward to count progress made on non-
combat days. Among the specifications using division type as the excluded instruments in 
columns (1) to (5), the coefficient on U.S. fatalities is positive in the two specifications without 
additional controls beyond date and continent and is negative in the remaining eight 
specifications. Among the specifications with the additional controls, the cost per life saved 
estimates range from $0.1 million to $1.9 million. The specifications with all of the controls 
produce estimates of $0.4 million to $0.6 million per life saved, with both coefficients being 
more than twice the values of their respective standard errors. 
                                                            
15 We exclude the 10 combat days of the 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne in December 1944 from the sample 
due to high numbers of attached troops and tanks that made them unrepresentative of a typical airborne organization. 
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When U.S. troops and tanks and their interaction are the instruments (columns (6) to 
(15)), the specifications are also sensitive to the inclusion of controls. When we include controls 
beyond date and continent, and when km progress is the measure of success in panel A, we 
obtain a small positive coefficient on U.S. fatalities in the sample with low tank-intensity and 
negative coefficients on U.S. fatalities in the full sample and in the sample with high-tank 
intensity. However, the specifications with negative coefficients on U.S. fatalities also produce 
negative coefficients for km progress, suggesting that the specifications in columns (6)-(15) of 
panel A also do not adequately control for mission effectiveness. In the corresponding 
specifications in panel B, we observe a consistently positive coefficient on mission success and 
estimated costs per life saved of $1.2 million for the full sample, –$0.1 million for the low tank 
intensity sample, and $0.4 million for the high tank intensity sample (which includes some units 
around the tank-intensity level of the infantry division), which are results generally consistent 
with panel A of Table 1. Similar results appear for the fixed effects sample as for the full sample; 
however, the results become too imprecise to make inferences when we add fixed effects to the 
regressions in columns (14) and (15). 
After taking into account placing value on soldiers' lives, our estimates from the mission 
effectiveness data suggest that the U.S. government initially appeared to value armored troops' 
lives more than those of infantry troops. Although the cost/value discrepancy between soldiers 
existed initially, the government seems to have regarded that decision as a mistake and 
reorganized the divisions in 1943. The reorganization largely corrected the discrepancy in the 
valuation of soldiers' lives between the armored and infantry units. An additional explanation for 
the difference in the two estimates is that soldiers in armored divisions had more human capital 
than soldiers in infantry divisions. Although we believe that some of the difference in the 
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evaluation of troops lives is due to differences in training expenditures, which we measure, we 
interpret other differences as due to soldiers in armored divisions having more experience and 
higher quality experience than infantry soldiers. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Our study has examined tradeoffs that the U.S. government made among different types 
of military units so as to save soldiers’ lives in WWII. Multiple data sources let us measure 
physical inputs, fatalities, geographical characteristics, and dollar expenditures of each unit, 
including new data compiled from archival sources on the experiences of all 67 U.S. divisions 
that fought on the Western Front. We examined the effects of substitution among three different 
types of units -- armored, infantry, and airborne divisions -- as well as the effects of mid-war 
reorganizations of each unit type. The conceptual framework presented guided us in 
understanding the interactions among the physical inputs of the unit, the intensity with which the 
unit was used, and the difficulty of tasks to which it was assigned. We also developed a 
procedure for estimating the marginal cost of reducing U.S. fatalities through an increase in tank 
intensity. If the U.S. government acted as though it were an economically rational decision 
maker who equated marginal costs and marginal benefits then the estimated marginal cost 
provides a measure of the implicit value that the government placed on reducing American 
military deaths. 
 Although variable across specifications, our empirical results indicate that, at moderate 
tank-intensity levels such as that of the infantry division, the cost per life saved from an increase 
in tank intensity for a deployment with average usage and task difficulty was roughly zero to 
$0.5 million in 2009 dollars. The cost of life saving range falls below Costa and Kahn’s (2004) 
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$1 million to $2 million estimate of the private valuation of risk reductions among young men in 
the 1940s. At relatively high tank-intensity levels, such as that of the armored division, the cost 
per life saved from an increase in tank intensity was roughly $2 million to $6 million or more in 
2009 dollars. Thus, our results suggest that relative to the private value of citizens at the time the 
U.S. government implicitly undervalued infantrymen’s lives and slightly overvalued armored 
personnel’s lives. Both the 1943 reorganization of the armored division, which greatly reduced 
costs and slightly increased fatalities, and the 1944 reorganization of the airborne division, which 
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Figure 1: U.S. Troops, Tanks, Estimated Cost, and Combat Outcomes by Division Type (Engagement Data)
                   Panel A: Actual U.S. Troops         Panel B: Actual U.S. Tanks      
 
 
              Panel C: Estimated Cost for Actual Division 
 
      Panel D: Km Advanced 
 




                    
Notes to Figure 1: Actual troops and tanks are taken from primary sources such as morning roll call counts. Costs 
measured as $92,400 per troop, $5.84 million per tank, and an additional $1.63 million per tank used in an armored 
division due to armored divisions’ higher rates of tank losses. Estimated costs are in 2009 U.S. dollars. Mission 































































Figure 2: Combat Outcomes and Usage in Combat by Division Type (Division by Day Panel) 
  Panel A: Number of Axis     
Divisions in Cell    
  Panel B: Fraction of Days in Theater        
with U.S. KIA ≥ 5      
 
 
                   Panel C: Km of Progress per Day Panel D: U.S. KIA per Day 
 
 
Panel E: Km per Day with Axis 
Divisions in Cell 
Panel F: U.S. KIA per Day with Axis 
Division in Cell 
                 
                 
                
Notes to Figure 2: Data and variables are defined in the same way as in Table A1. Panels E and F show U.S. km of 
progress per day and U.S. KIA, respectively when the sample is restricted to observations in which one or more 


















































Figure 3: Estimated Costs, Fatalities, and Military Production Isoquants by Division Type 
Panel A: Division by Day Data, Axis in Cell, No Controls Panel B: Division by Day Data, Axis in Cell w/ Controls
    
Panel C: Division by Day Data, U.S. KIA ≥ 5, No Controls Panel D: Division by Day Data, U.S. KIA ≥ 5 w/ Controls 
    
Panel E: Engagement Data by Division Type, No Controls Panel F: Engagement Data by Division Type w/ Controls 
    
Panel G: Troop & Tank Regressions, No Controls   Panel H: Troop & Tank Regressions w/ Controls 
    
Notes to Figure 3: In each panel, the points show estimated costs and fatalities for a given division type over a 10.8-month deployment, 
assuming average usage. The black dots correspond to armored divisions, the white dots correspond to infantry divisions, and the gray dots 
correspond to airborne divisions; both pre- and post-reorganization means are shown. The dashed curves show hand-drawn isoquants for 
military effectiveness that are consistent with the estimated levels of effectiveness of each division type. Effectiveness in panels A to D is 
km advanced while engaged in panels E to H with the mission success index. All w/controls specifications include the full set of controls.
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Notes to Table 1: Variables and data are the same as in Appendix Table A3. All specifications control for continent dummies and a daily time trend. Continent dummies include North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and 
Northwest Europe. Additional controls include numbers of German, Italian, German Panzer, Axis SS, German Parachute, U.S., non-U.S. Allied, and Allied armored divisions in the same cell and numbers in 
neighboring cells, degrees slope, monthly wet days, precipitation, and mean temperature, dummies for slope > 5 degrees, wet or rainy, wooded or mixed vegetation, and cultivated land, prior days in theater, prior 
days with U.S. KIA ≥5, and days in the past 30 days with U.S. KIA ≥5. Wet or rainy indicates whether wet days exceeded 20 or precipitation exceeded 125 mm for that cell in that month. Standard errors reported 
for all coefficients are clustered by division x year x month interaction. The letter "a" as reported for the Over Identification Chi denotes that the equation was exactly identified due to collinearity of the 
instruments. ** indicates the coefficient exceeds twice the value of its clustered standard error; * indicates the coefficient is more than 1.68 times larger but less than twice its clustered standard error. 
  
Table 1: 2SLS Estimates of the Cost Function for Military Operations, Division by Day Panel 
      (1)          (2)            (3)   (4)   (5) (6)  (7)  (8)      (9)       (10)        (11)         (12)         (13)        (14)         (15) 
                                                                                  Dependent Variable is Estimated Dollar Cost per Day in Millions of 2009 Dollars 
                 Panel A: Division Days in Which Axis Divisions in Cell ≥ 1 
                                        Excluded Instruments are Indicators for Armored, Airborne, Post-Reorganization*Infantry, Post-Reorganization*Armored, and Post-Reorganization*Airborne 
Variable Full Sample Fixed Effects Sample Only Armored and Infantry 
Only Infantry and 
Airborne 






Km of  2.093 -0.288 5.670 -2.993 2.997 8.408 6.507 -15.06 -9.403 8.207 1.127 0.423 -0.233 -27.69 0.247 
Progress (12.20) (9.057) (3.083)* (3.517) (3.761) (9.157) (5.644) (21.01) (6.226) (10.50) (1.516) (4.939) (0.746) (128.7) (6.046) 
U.S.  -1.436 -1.926 -0.476 -0.408 -0.332 -1.428 -0.524 0.048 -0.126 -1.475 -0.888 -1.637 -0.440 -4.371 -0.854 
Fatalities (0.583)** (0.625)** (0.177)** (0.193)** (0.387) (0.768)* (0.354) (2.464) (0.183) (0.615)** (0.261)** (0.576)** (0.217)** (12.31) (0.658) 
Km 1st Stage F 0.962 0.845 1.395 0.739 6.071 1.273 1.605 0.264 1.029 0.991 3.262 1.833 0.001 0.779 2.853 
Fatal. 1st Stage F 23.61 8.501 17.66 4.503 4.246 7.227 12.74 0.352 10.84 5.700 4.974 4.607 0.441 5.163 10.30 
Over Ident. Chi2 8.682 2.434 40.24 15.48 0.000 3.436 21.65 0.133 0.002 0.024 0.130 a a 0.000 0.000 
N (Division Days) 4,430 1,137 4,107 3,689 1,064 598 3,832 
Clusters (Division Months) 470 115 441 371 128 66 407 
Panel B: Division Days in Which U.S. KIA ≥ 5 
Km of  6.955 -18.58 -17.82 -0.996 0.273 -80.49 -13.85 7.891 -5.597 33.66 1.554 -0.846 -7.537 -22.39 -15.57 
Progress (7.509) (27.46) (14.28) (5.292) (0.327) (338.1) (12.37) (8.692) (3.833) (94.89) (4.155) (11.65) (3.529)** (95.47) (23.00) 
U.S.  -0.711 -4.673 -2.521 -3.197 -0.118 -14.48 -2.292 -0.014 -0.295 2.068 -1.502 -4.956 -0.066 -4.849 -1.180 
Fatalities (1.202) (4.587) (1.295)* (3.276) (0.845) (53.23) (1.025)** (1.141) (0.229) (10.44) (0.893)* (5.268) (0.135) (15.15) (1.102) 
Km 1st Stage F 1.558 1.725 0.962 1.263 2.177 2.376 0.719 0.252 2.317 0.733 1.490 0.725 2.833 1.800 0.684 
Fatal. 1st Stage F 15.07 12.05 7.493 0.474 0.216 16.38 10.08 1.103 6.299 3.886 2.270 1.992 0.242 20.47 6.821 
Over Ident. Chi2 10.95 1.033 0.424 a a 0.013 0.017 0.610 0.874 0.074 2.830 a a 0.000 a 
Continent & Trnd        Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Controls      Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes     Yes Yes      Yes Yes     Yes Yes     Yes Yes 
Axis Division FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
U.S. Division FEs Yes 
N (Division Days) 4,579 1,221 4,395 3,841 922 621 3,958 
Clusters (Division Months) 516   137 488 407 137 82 436 
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 Notes to Table 2: Sortie and enemy input controls include U.S. and German aerial sorties, German troops, German tanks, number of German Panzer divisions, and number of Axis SS or German Parachute 
divisions in the same cell. Terrain, weather, and vegetation controls include dummies for mountain or river, rugged terrain, wet or rainy, temperate, wooded or mixed vegetation, and urban or con-urban. Human 
factor controls include an indicator for whether the U.S. was the attacking force and indices for leadership, training and force quality, intelligence and planning, logistics and reserves, morale, surprise, and 
defensive fortifications. Low and high tank intensity are defined relative to the median. All standard errors reported adjust for clustering by engagement. ** indicates the coefficient exceeds twice the value of its 
clustered standard error; and * indicates the coefficient is more than 1.68 times larger but than twice its clustered standard error.
Table 2: 2SLS Estimates of the Cost Function for Military Operations, Engagement Data 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8)   (9)        (10)   (11)   (12)        (13)   (14)  (15) 
                                                                                        Dependent Variable is Estimated Cost per Day in Millions of 2009 Dollars 
                        Panel A: Mission Effectiveness Measured as Km Progress 
Excluded Instruments are Indicators for Armored, Post-
Reorganization*Infantry, and Post-Reorganization*Armored                           Excluded Instruments are U.S. Troops, U.S. Tanks, and U.S. Troops * U.S. Tanks 
Variable Excluding Airborne Full Sample Low Tank Intensity High Tank Intensity Fixed Effects Sample 
Km of  -1,411 558.1 -721.6 21.73 74.22 48.58 -338.8 279.6 47.06 1,051 -365.0 -961.2 89.28 274.6 227.6 
Progress (3,449) (594.2) (1,425) (58.19) (68.44) (1,220) (361.6) (127.9)** (27.39)* (2,009) (260.9) (2,265) (91.69) (219.3) (306.0) 
                
U.S.  3.838 -1.244 -0.889 -0.120 -0.386 7.049 -3.344 0.427 0.195 10.36 -2.252 7.057 -1.080 -0.880 1.380 
Fatalities (13.61) (1.414) (1.833) (0.178) (0.170)** (7.808) (2.904) (1.006) (0.099)* (17.58) (1.794) (12.46) (0.662) (0.670) (1.775) 
                
Km 1st Stage F 0.433 0.322 0.197 2.223 1.656 0.360 1.048 3.280 2.770 1.247 2.775 0.873 1.293 1.269 0.568 
Fatal. 1st Stage F 0.399 0.701 1.299 5.148 11.75 0.390 0.898 0.463 20.49 0.421 2.698 0.893 1.161 2.850 0.868 
Over Ident. Chi2 0.037 0.175 0.746 18.04 26.25 0.001 1.154 0.567 11.39 0.043 0.275 0.017 8.232 1.244 1.992 
Panel B: Mission Effectiveness Measured with Zero to One Index 
Index of 2,995 -760.4 2,296 4,053 2,578 578.0 3,064 5,487 727.0 7,194 4,612 13,757 4,295 41,343 5,847 
Success (872.7)** (2,570) (925.9)** (1,562)** (753.8)** (13,561) (1,571)* (10,558) (343.5)** (4,246)* (2,353)* (9,711) (2,565)* (188,232) (17,217) 
                
U.S.  0.630 -1.896 -0.461 -0.212 -0.626 6.727 -1.227 -2.191 0.100 -0.052 -0.394 -2.247 -1.584 6.793 -2.517 
Fatalities (1.251) (1.696) (0.592) (0.379) (0.202)** (12.12) (0.783) (4.114) (0.112) (1.823) (0.407) (3.879) (1.199) (35.59) (8.368) 
                
Index 1st Stage F 10.54 5.180 6.647 2.420 4.551 3.747 5.380 0.558 3.626 1.217 1.771 1.548 1.973 1.177 1.969 
Fatal. 1st Stage F 0.399 0.701 1.299 5.148 11.75 0.390 0.898 0.463 20.49 0.421 2.698 0.893 1.161 2.850 0.868 
Over Ident. Chi2 5.773 1.806 7.318 3.132 0.195 0.001 3.527 0.322 14.30 5.151 9.130 0.020 0.127 0.069 0.312 
Date & Continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sorties & Enemy Inputs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Terrain & Weather Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Human Factors   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Axis Division FEs Yes Yes 
U.S. Division FEs Yes Yes 
N (Division Days) 279 289 150 139 225 
Clusters (Engagements)   152     162 75 87 132 
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Appendix to “Reducing Risks in Wartime Through Capital-Labor Substitution: Evidence from 




This appendix is a supplement to “Reducing Risks in Wartime Through Capital-Labor 
Substitution: Evidence from World War II.” This document provides more detail than the text 
and data appendix of the paper on the effects of alternative specifications and the sources and 
calculations used to construct the datasets used in the study.  An exhaustive compilation of the 
Excel spreadsheets, Stata programs, and Xeroxed archived records used in these calculations will 
be provided on request. 
 
 The remainder of this appendix proceeds as follows.  Section II presents auxiliary results 
to those shown in Figure 3 and Tables 1 and 2 of the main paper.  Section III describes the 
sources and calculations used to construct the division by day panel dataset.  Section IV 
describes the engagement data in greater detail.  Section V documents the sources and 
calculations for the construction of the cost estimates. 
 
II. Auxiliary Results 
 
 This next section presents addition results on the effects of organizational structure that 
help to illustrate the mechanisms and calculations and explore the robustness of the findings.  
First, we present the numbers corresponding to the isoquant graphs in Figure 3 and use these to 
compute the cost per life saved using an alternative approach that does not involve 2SLS.  
Second, we show results from the first-stage regressions in tabular form.  Third, we present 
alternative specifications to probe the sensitivity of the main results. 
 
A. Alternative Cost per Life Saved Calculations 
 
 Table A3 presents in tabular form the totals by division type that are shown in Figure 3 of 
the main paper.  Each column shows the totals for kilometers advanced (averaged across combat 
days in the sample being used), the subjective index of mission success (only for the engagement 
data), total U.S. deaths, and cost in billions of 2009 dollars for that division type.  Rows 1 
through 12 show estimates for the pre-reorganization division types, and rows 13 through 24 
show estimates for the post-reorganization division types.  The eight columns show estimates for 
the eight specifications shown in Figure 3.  The relationships among these different numbers are 
discussed when Figure 3 is presented in the text; this table is included in the appendix so that the 
reader is able to see the exact values for each of the numbers in the graph. 
 
In column (1) of Table A3, armored divisions advanced 1.929 km per combat day as 
compared to 1.058 km per combat day for infantry divisions.  Hence, the results from column (1) 
of Table A3 suggest that replacing infantry with armored would increase the rate of advance by 
(1.929 -1.058) = 0.871 km per combat day.  In the sample column, we see that the post-
reorganization armored division advanced 1.706 km per combat day, making it 0.223 km per 
combat day less than the pre-reorganization armored division.  As a first approximation, a policy 
that would reduce fatalities and hold the rate of advance constant would be to replace pre-
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reorganization infantry with pre-reorganization armor, thus increasing the rate of advance by 
0.871 km per combat day, and then to implement the reorganization of the armored division 
0.871/0.223 = 3.906 times, bringing km advanced per combat day back down to the level of the 
pre-reorganization infantry division.  To calculate the reduction in fatalities from this 
combination of policies, we first compute 2,120 -1,059 = 1,061 the difference in fatalities 
between pre-reorganization infantry and pre-reorganization armor, and we add to it 3.906 times 
the difference in fatalities between pre- and post-reorganization armor (1,059 -1,116), giving us 
3.906*(-57) = -223.  Hence, the total reduction in fatalities from this combination of policies 
would be 1,061-223 = 838.  The increase in dollar costs would be $4.20 billion -$1.92 billion 
plus 3.906 times ($2.90 billion – 4.20 billion), giving an overall reduction in costs of -$2.80 
billion.  The cost per life saved from this combination of policies is -$2.80 billion divided by 
838, or roughly negative $3.3 million.  As mentioned in the main text, when only three division 
types are included in the sample (in this case, pre-reorganization infantry, pre-reorganization 
armor, and post-reorganization armor), then this calculation is mathematically identical to the 
2SLS procedure used in the paper.  A similar type of calculation and equivalent 2SLS procedure 
are shown in Rohlfs (2006b), where the two excluded instruments are U.S. troops and U.S. tanks 
and the policies involve increasing U.S. tanks and reducing U.S. troops.  A variety of different 
policy combinations can be explored, each giving a different estimate of the cost per life saved. 
 
Table A4 calculates the cost per life saved for six different effectiveness-neutral policy 
combinations for each of the specifications shown in Table A3.  The estimate in the upper left is 
the same negative $3.3 million calculated in the paragraph above.   The degree to which the 
second policy is implemented varies across specifications depending on how much is necessary 
to keep mission accomplishment constant.  Each combination shown here includes one 
reorganization and one replacement of a division type with another.  The standard error is 
computed by running the two first stage regressions (with km of progress and U.S. fatalities as 
the dependent variables) as a system and applying the delta method (suest and nlcom in Stata).  
The figures below the costs per life saved show the reduction in fatalities generated by each 
policy combination.  As the results from Table A4 show, the estimated cost per life saved varies 
considerably depending on the specification and the combination of policies being examined.  
Across all of the estimates shown, the average cost per life saved is -$1.2 million and the median 
cost per life saved is $0.2 million.  It is straightforward to check that, if one considers replacing 
armored with airborne and then partially replacing airborne with infantry (a combination not 
shown here), the estimated cost per life saved is the same as the pre- or post-reorganization cost 
per life saved shown in Table 1 of the main paper. 
 
B. First-Stage Regressions 
 
 Tables A5 through A7 present first-stage estimates of the effects of organizational 
structure on km of progress and U.S. fatalities.  Table A5 presents estimates of the combat 
effects of the pre- and post-reorganization division type indicators using the division by day 
panel.  The dependent variable is kilometers of progress in panel A and U.S. fatalities (the scaled 
version of U.S. KIA) in panel B.  Within each panel, each column shows results from a separate 
OLS regression.  The regressors of interest are an indicator for post-reorganization interacted 
with each of armored, infantry, and airborne and un-interacted indicators for armored and 
airborne; pre-reorganization infantry is the excluded division type.  In columns (1) to (5), the 
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sample is restricted to division days in which the U.S. division was in the same geographical cell 
as one or more Axis division.  In columns (6) to (10), the sample is restricted to division days in 
which U.S. KIA was five or greater.  The full samples are used in columns (1) to (3) and (6) to 
(8), and the fixed effects samples are used in columns (4) to (5) and (9) to (10).  Columns (1) and 
(6) include a time trend and fixed continent effects, as in the first column of Table 1 of the main 
paper.  Columns (2) and (7) add controls for the numbers of nearby Allied and Axis units of 
different types, terrain, vegetation, weather, and combat experience, as in the second column of 
Table 1 in the main paper.  Columns (3) and (8) add fixed effects for month by year interactions, 
Axis divisions, and 0.25 x 0.25 coordinate geographical cells, as in the third column of Table 1.  
The same set of controls is used in columns (4) and (9) as in column (3) and (8); however, the 
fixed effects samples are used.  Columns (5) and (10) add U.S. division fixed effects.  Standard 
errors clustered by division x month are shown in parentheses. 
 
 While they vary across specifications, the results from Table A5 are generally consistent 
with the patterns observed in Figure 3.  Shifting from pre-reorganization infantry to pre-
reorganization armor appears to increase combat effectiveness.  The coefficient on armored in 
panel B shows a consistently negative effect of pre-reorganization armored relative to pre-
reorganization infantry on U.S. KIA.  The coefficient on armored in panel A varies across 
specifications and averages to about zero.  Hence, usage intensity appears to have been lower for 
pre-reorganization armor relative to pre-reorganization infantry, so that the higher combat 
effectiveness led to similar geographical progress and lower fatalities.  The results also suggest 
that shifting from pre-reorganization infantry to pre-reorganization airborne may have reduced 
combat effectiveness.  In column (9), we observe large negative effects of airborne on progress 
and fatalities consistent with very low usage intensity.  For the other specifications, the effect of 
airborne on progress switches signs across specifications and is on average slightly positive, and 
we observe a somewhat consistent and relatively large positive effect of airborne on U.S. KIA, a 
result consistent with a relatively ineffective force with high usage intensity. 
 
 As with Figure 3, the OLS results in Table A5 do not show a clear reduction in combat 
effectiveness of the armored division following the dramatic reduction in troops and tanks under 
the reorganization.  While they vary somewhat across specifications, we find generally positive 
effects of the armored reorganization on progress and U.S. KIA, a result that is consistent with 
an increase in usage intensity.  In the fixed effects specifications, however, we do observe a 
result consistent with a decline in the armored division’s effectiveness: the armored 
reorganization appears to have considerably increased U.S. KIA and decreased or only slightly 
increased geographical progress.  The OLS results for the infantry reorganization tend to show a 
slight positive effect on progress and a generally negative effect on U.S. KIA, a result consistent 
with an increase in combat effectiveness, despite the slight reduction in troops.  The fixed effects 
estimates of the effects of the infantry reorganization are similar to the OLS in the division days 
with five or more U.S. KIA sample.  In the division days with one or more Axis unit in the cell, 
however, the fixed effects estimates show significant declines in progress and U.S. KIA – a 
result consistent with a decline in usage intensity – and they do not suggest a large increase in 
combat effectiveness.  The estimated effects of the airborne reorganization in column (9) 
indicates a large negative effect of the reorganization on combat effectiveness, with large 
declines in progress and large increases in fatalities.  For the remaining nine specifications, 
however, the results are consistent with a positive effect of the reorganization on combat 
   42
effectiveness.  In the progress regressions, the coefficient changes signs across specifications and 
are on average slightly positive, and we observe a generally negative effect of the airborne 
reorganization on U.S. KIA. 
 
 Table A6 estimates the combat effects of the pre- and post-reorganization division types 
in the engagement data.  Each column shows results from a different regression.  The dependent 
variable is kilometers of progress in columns (1) and (2), the zero to one index of mission 
success in columns (3) and (4), the trichotomous win-lose-draw success measure in columns (5) 
and (6), U.S. KIA in columns (7) and (8), U.S. tank losses in columns (9) and (10), and German 
KIA in columns (11) and (12).   All twelve regressions exclude the ten airborne observations.  
Consequently, the only coefficients of interest are an indicator for armored and the interactions 
of post-reorganization times indicators for armored and infantry.  Additionally, data on tank 
losses are only available for 215 of the 279 combat days.  The specifications in columns (1), (3), 
(5), (7), (9), and (11) control for a time trend and continent fixed effects; columns (2), (4), (6), 
(8), (10), and (12) add controls for U.S. aerial sorties, enemy inputs, terrain, weather, vegetation, 
and human factors.  Sufficient data do not exist to estimate these regressions with U.S. or Axis 
division fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered by engagement are shown in parentheses. 
 
 As with the division by day results, the estimates in Table A6 are generally consistent 
with the patterns shown in the graphical results.  The estimated effects for armored divisions tend 
to indicate a positive effect of being a pre-reorganization armored division on combat 
effectiveness.  With the exception of a negative effect on progress in the specification with no 
controls, we to observe a positive effect of armor on the various measures of mission success, 
and we observe a negative effect on U.S. KIA; the negative effect on U.S. KIA is large and 
significant in the specification with controls.  We also observe a large and significant positive 
effect of armored on U.S. tank losses.  
 
 The results on the effect of the armored reorganization on the different mission success 
measures are mixed but generally negative.  The estimated effects on U.S. KIA are also mixed, 
but in the specifications with controls, the effects of the reorganization on U.S. KIA and U.S. 
tank losses are both negative, and the effects on total U.S. tank losses are large and significant.  
Hence, usage intensity appears to have declined in response to the armored reorganization; 
however, the effects on combat effectiveness are unclear.  The estimated effects of the infantry 
reorganization similarly suggest a decline in usage intensity.  The coefficients for this 
reorganization are also mixed for the different outcome measures; however, for the specifications 
with controls, the effects on success and U.S. KIA both tend to be negative.   
 
 Next, Table A7 presents first-stage results from the troop and tank regressions in the 
engagement data.  Rather than measure the effects of division type and the reorganizations, the 
regressors of interest in Table A7 are U.S. Troops/10,000, U.S. Tanks/100, and the interaction of 
these two.  Hence, these specifications suppose that the effects of division type reflect a more 
general input-output relationship.  The dependent variable is kilometers of progress in panel A, 
the index of mission accomplishment in panel B, and U.S. KIA in panel C.  Within each panel, 
each column shows results from a different OLS regression.  Columns (1) and (2) use the full 
sample of 289 division days, and columns (3) to (6) use the fixed effects sample.  The 
regressions in columns (1) and (3) control for a time trend and continent fixed effects.  Columns 
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(2) and (5) add controls for enemy inputs, terrain, weather, vegetation, and human factors.  
Column (4) includes a time trend, continent fixed effects, and U.S. and Axis division fixed 
effects, and Column (5) includes the full set of controls plus U.S. and Axis division fixed effects. 
 
The effects of troops and tanks vary considerably by outcome variable.  In panel A, we 
observe mixed to negative effects of U.S. troops, positive effects of U.S. tanks, and a generally 
negative troop-tank interaction effect on geographical progress.  In panel B, we observe a 
positive and sometimes large and significant effect of troops, a mixed but generally positive and 
sometimes significant effect of tanks, and a mixed but generally negative and sometimes 
significant troop-tank interaction effect on the index of mission success.   In panel C, we observe 
a generally positive and sometimes large effect of troops on U.S. KIA, mixed results for tanks, 
and a generally negative troop-tank interaction term.  Hence, U.S. troops appear to contribute 
substantially to mission accomplishment in a subjective sense; however, their contribution is not 
through geographical progress, and it is associated with higher casualties.  Tanks appear to 
increase geographical progress and success but not casualties.  Averaging across the 
specifications, the results suggest that one tank contributes about as much to mission 
accomplishment as do 34 troops. 
 
C. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 The remainder of this section presents alternative specifications to probe the robustness 
of the results.  Figure A1 and Table A8 show results in which the division by day panel are 
collapsed to the corps by day level.  U.S. divisions’ corps affiliations were obtained from Stanton 
(1984) and supplemented with information from Haskew (2009) on the corps affiliations of non-
U.S. allied forces.  Locations are then averaged across all divisions in the corps that day, and 
corps-level progress is estimated based on the location of the average U.S. division in the corps.  
U.S. fatalities are added up across all U.S. divisions in the corps, and the nearby enemy, terrain, 
vegetation, weather, and experience variables are averaged across the U.S. divisions in the corps.  
The division type indicators are also summed across divisions in the corps, so that each 
instrument measures the number of U.S. divisions of that type in the corps that day.  The nearby 
unit controls are replaced with measures of the numbers of nondivisional units and non-U.S. 
Allied divisions in the corps.  The total number of divisions in the corps is added as a control 
variable, so that the instruments influence substitution from one division to another and not the 
adding and subtracting of divisions. 
 
 Figure A1 shows the same isoquant graphs as are presented in Figure 3, but for the corps 
by day specifications.  Only the Axis divisions in cell definition of combat days is used, because 
having five or more U.S. KIA is difficult to interpret in the corps setting when engagement with 
the enemy might vary across divisions in the corps.  In each panel, costs on the vertical axis are 
the same as in Figure 3.  Each division’s contribution to U.S. fatalities is measured by regressing 
U.S. fatalities on pre-reorganization times armored, pre-reorganization times infantry, etc.  The 
coefficients on the division type variables are plotted along the horizontal axis.  Similar 
regressions are run with km progress on the left-hand side to determine the values for the mission 
effectiveness isoquants.  Panel A shows results in which no controls are included in the 
regressions, and panel B shows results in which the full set of controls is included. 
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The armored and infantry divisions and the post-reorganization airborne division are 
generally appear in the same places on the graphs in Figure A1 as in Figure 3.  The one 
noticeable difference between the two figures is that the pre-reorganization airborne division has 
considerably lower fatalities.  One primary explanation for the difference in pre-reorganization 
airborne is that, due to their small numbers of troops and consequent low combat effectiveness,  
the 13th and 17th Airborne Divisions were used at low intensity relative to other units in their 
corps.  The general shape from Figure 3 is repeated in panel A of Figure A1, with a steep portion 
at the higher cost levels and a flatter portion at higher fatality levels, but with kinks in the middle 
ranges.  The differences are somewhat less pronounced, however.  Moving from the cost level of 
the pre-reorganized to that of the post-reorganized armored division on the middle isoquant, the 
slope is –$1.4 million per life saved.  At the lower cost levels, moving from the cost level of the 
post-reorganized infantry to that of the post-reorganized airborne the slope of the isoquant is –
$0.6 million per life saved.  When controls are added to the regressions in panel B, we observe a 
backward-bending portion to the curves, and the slopes of the isoquants are less clear than in 
panel A. 
 
Table A8 shows the corps-by-day counterparts to the 2SLS regressions in Table 1.  Due 
to the nature of corps organization, it is not straightforward using these data to restrict the sample 
to specific division types.  As in Figure A1, only the nearby Axis forces definition of combat 
days is used.  Columns (1) to (3) are the same as in columns (1) to (3) of panel A in Table 1.  
Column (4) adds corps fixed effects.  Column (5) uses the fixed effects sample in which the 
sample is restricted to corps that at one time contained a division that was reorganized in the 
theater.  Column (6) adds division fixed effects.  Columns (7) to (11) show the same 
specifications in the just identified case in which the reorganizations are ignored and armored 
and airborne are the only excluded instruments.  The division fixed effects specification is not 
estimable in this case because armored and airborne are perfectly collinear with the division 
fixed effects. 
 
 The coefficient on km progress in Table A8 tends to be larger than in Table 1 because the 
cost and value of moving multiple divisions are larger than for moving a single division.  The 
estimated cost per life saved is smaller than in Table 1.  When all division types are included in 
the sample with nearby Axis divisions in Table 1, the average and median cost per life saved 
estimates are $0.9 million and $0.5 million.  In Table A8, the average and median cost per life 
saved estimates are considerably smaller, and $0.2 million and $0.1 million. 
 
 Tables A9 and A10 explore the importance of autocorrelation in biasing the standard 
errors in Tables 1 and 2.  In general, changing the form of clustering has little effect on the 
overall precision of the estimates.  Table A9 shows estimates for the seven columns from Table 1 
that do not include any of the fixed effects.  Underneath each coefficient, the first number in 
parentheses is the benchmark standard error, which is constructed by clustering by division x 
year x month.  The second number in parentheses is a standard error that corrects for clustering 
by corps x year x month, and the third number in parentheses shows a standard error that corrects 
for clustering by division.  On average, the standard errors are roughly 15% larger when 
clustering by corps x year x month and roughly 15% smaller when clustering by division.  
Moving from division x year x month to corps x year x month clustering, only one of the 28 
coefficients changes significance, moving from significant to marginally significant.  Moving 
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from division x year x month to division clustering, one coefficient goes from marginally 
significant to significant, and another goes from insignificant to significant. 
 
Table A10 shows estimates from the eight columns from Table 2 that do not include 
fixed effects or the full set of controls.  The first row in parentheses underneath each coefficient 
is the benchmark standard error that corrects for clustering by engagement, and the second row 
in parentheses is a standard error that adjusts for clustering by division.  The standard errors that 
cluster by division tend to be roughly 10% larger, and when moving from clustering by 
engagement to clustering by division, one significant coefficient becomes marginally significant, 
and one marginally significant coefficient becomes insignificant. 
 
 Table A11 shows a handful of alternative specifications for the 2SLS regressions using 
the engagement data.  The benchmark cases with the full sets of controls are shown in column 
(1) for the specification using division type as the excluded instruments and in column (8) for the 
specification using troops, tanks, and their interaction as the excluded instruments.  Columns (1) 
and (2) include the full sample excluding the 101st Airborne.  Columns (8) and (9) include the 
full sample.  Columns (3), (4), (10), and (11) remove observations in which the U.S. was the 
defending force.  Columns (5), (6), (12), and (13)  remove observations in which German aerial 
sorties were not zero.  Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (8), (10), (12), and (14) include the full set of 
controls.  Columns (2), (4), (6), (9), (11), and (13) remove U.S. sorties and enemy inputs as 
controls. 
 
 The results from columns (1) to (6) and (8) to (13) of Table A11 indicate that the 
coefficients of interest are somewhat sensitive to how strategic actions are modeled.  In ten of the 
twelve specifications estimated with and without controls for U.S. sorties and enemy inputs, 
removing those variables from the set of controls reduces the estimated cost per life saved.  The 
magnitude of this effect is nontrivial; however, the general pattern in the data is the same 
whether or not the U.S. sorties and enemy input controls are included.  Across all of these 
specifications, when all of the controls are included, we obtain average and median costs per life 
saved of $1.4 million and $0.8 million.  When the U.S. sorties and enemy inputs are removed 
from the set of controls, we obtain average and median cost per life saved estimates of $1.6 
million and $0.4 million.  Restricting the sample to cases in which the U.S. was the attacking 
force or cases with no Axis air support generally increases the estimated cost per life saved; 
however, it decreases the estimated cost per life saved in the troop and tank regressions using the 
mission success index.  These changes to the specification also have nontrivial effects on the 
estimates but do not qualitatively affect the pattern of results. 
 
In columns (7) and (14), of Table A11 the cost of the division is assumed to be larger if it 
has medium tanks than if it has light tanks.  The costs are assumed to be proportional to the 
purchase prices of the items.  A light tank is assumed to be 84.9% and a medium tank is assumed 
to be 110.3% of the cost of a tank used in the benchmark calculations, so that the cost of a 1942 
organic armored division is unchanged.  Additionally, in column (14), light and heavy tanks are 
included as separate instruments and are separately interacted with troops.  Both columns (7) and 
(14) drop the one observation in which the fraction medium versus light tanks is not known. 
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In the regressions in column (7) in which only the cost variable is changed, we see 
hardily any effect of treating medium and light tanks separately.  In the troop and tank 
regressions in column (14) in which the set of instruments changes as well, treating medium and 
light tanks separately generates lower but more precise estimates of the cost per life saved in the 
regressions using km advanced as the mission effectiveness variable, and it produces similar and 
slightly more precise estimates of the cost per life saved in the regressions using the index of 
success. 
 
III. Division by Day Panel 
 
 This next section describes in greater detail than in the main text of the paper the data 
used to construct the division by day panel.  The three types of data sources described here are 
the U.S. fatalities data, those measuring Allied and Axis unit locations, and the geographic 
characteristics. 
 
A. U.S. Fatalities Data 
 
 U.S. military fatalities are measured from seven different data sources.  These data 
sources are summarized briefly in Table A12 and are described in greater detail in the paragraphs 
below.  The WWII casualties dataset that is used in the analysis was obtained by combining 
these sources to obtain non-missing values for a large number of observations and to compare 
values across the different sources to improve the accuracy of the data. 
 
Reading Room Data (U.S. War Department, 1947).  The primary source of fatalities information 
used in this study is a roster listing all 146,431 combat deaths to U.S. Army ground divisions in 
World War II, Army Chemical Warfare Service, and suicides and executions of U.S. Army 
troops.  The rosters are meant to be complete, though some missing observations have been 
found from other sources.  For each death, the data include name, serial number, divisional and 
battalion/regiment affiliation, rank, broad category of military occupation, and type of death 
(killed in action, died of wounds, or finding of death).  For 45.1% of cases, depending on the 
division, battalion/regiment, and the first letter of the soldier’s last name, the exact date of death 
was hand-entered onto the records near the time that they were printed.  Some of the numbers 
were unreadable or cut off, but accurate dates were recoverable from these data for 40.9% of 
cases.  Additionally, a few pages were missing from the original files.  The dataset was Xeroxed 
from paper records at National Archives II in College Park, Maryland.  With the help of financial 
assistance from the National Bureau of Economic Research and Syracuse University, these paper 
copies were scanned and sent as pdf files to Comat Technologies, Inc., in Bangalore, India, to 
have the data hand-entered.  Every variable except name was entered.  We then performed a first 
merge with the WWII serials file to identify individuals’ names and sent the data back to India to 
have these names checked and have the correct ones filled in.  For all variables except name, a 
second entry was typed in by me, and every inconsistency was double-checked and updated with 
the correct value.  The data were also compared against the other fatality data sources used in 
this study and were checked by us and a research assistant at Syracuse University for many types 
of internal inconsistencies including names appearing out alphabetical order, unusual clusters of 
letters in names, and duplicate serial numbers. 
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Airborne Division Deaths (U.S. Airborne in WWII, 2010).  One secondary source of U.S. deaths 
that is used in this study include name, rank, division, battalion or regiment, company (in many 
cases), general location, date of death (in nearly all cases), type of death (in some cases), and 
cemetery for all 9,209 combat and non-combat deaths to airborne divisions, including deaths to 
attached units.  These data do not include serial numbers; however, matches were generally 
possible with other data sources based on name, unit, rank, and date of death.  These data were 
downloaded in electronic form from a website entitled “U.S. Airborne in WWII” in January, 
2010. 
 
WWII Honor List (U.S. War Department, 1946).  These data include the name, rank, type of 
death, branch of service (Army including Army Air Forces, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard), 
hometown, state, and (for Army) serial number for all 307,185 U.S. Army military personnel 
who died in World War II, including battle and non-battle dead and missing personnel for ground 
and air forces.  The data do not include unit affiliations or date of death, but they constitute one 
particularly complete listing of the names and serial numbers of WWII casualties.  These lists are 
provided as multiple pdf files on the NARA website.  The American Battle Monuments 
Commission (ABMC) had an outside company hand-enter the data, and they provide the data 
along with data from the corresponding lists for the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard personnel, 
on the National WWII Memorial website.  The dataset is labeled on that site as “National 
Archives Records.”  A complete electronic copy of this dataset was obtained from ABMC 
through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted in January, 2009. 
 
Machine Records Data (U.S. War Department, 1944).  Another archival source of U.S. fatalities 
includes all 101,250 dead, missing, captured, and wounded personnel, battle and non-battle, for 
all military branches from 1941 through 1943.  The data include name, serial number, home 
county, rank, broad category of military occupation, type of casualty, and date of casualty.  
Xeroxes of these files were purchased from Archives II, scanned, and sent as pdf files to Comat 
Technologies, Inc., in Bangalore, India, to have the data hand-entered.  To save on time and 
expenditures, the name was not entered, and no second entry was made for any of the variables.  
However, the data have been merged with the other sources and checked for internal consistency 
to ensure the accuracy of the resulting casualties database.  The rosters are organized by state and 
county in the hard copies, and some pages are missing from the originals.  The last page in the 
Montana records include only casualty from Musselshell County, Montana; the remaining 
casualties from Musselshell County, Montana and casualties from counties that come 
alphabetically after Musselshell (Park County through Yellowstone National Park) are missing. 
 
ABMC Cemetery Files (U.S. ABMC, 2005).  These data include name, serial number, branch of 
service, divisional and battalion/regiment affiliation, rank, type of death, date of death, date of 
birth, age, home town, burial plot location, and awards won for 180,735 WWII battle and non-
battle deaths from any branch of service buried in American memorials and overseas military 
cemeteries.  These data are not representative and do not include individuals who were not 
recovered or were buried in non-military cemeteries; however, they include an extensive set of 
variables for the observations that are included.  These data are available as a searchable 
database on the ABMC website.  A complete electronic copy of the data was purchased for $50 
from ABMC in September 2008. 
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AGRS Remains not Recovered File (U.S. American Graves Registration Service, 1954).  These 
data include name, serial number, rank, branch of service, and date of loss for all 79,021 dead or 
missing American military personnel whose remains had not been recovered as of 1954.  A 
cleaned version of these data is available on multiple web pages on the website of the Defense 
Prisoner of War / Missing Personnel Office (DPMO); however, the cleaned version excludes 
many personnel whose remains were recovered after 1954.  Consequently, an electronic copy of 
the original, uncleaned version of these data was obtained through a FOIA request sent to the 
Department of Defense FOIA Office on March 2009 and forwarded to DPMO. 
 
WWII Serials Files (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2002).  These data 
include name, serial number, home state and county, enlistment location, date of enlistment, 
rank, branch of service, term of enlistment, country of birth, year of birth, race and citizenship, 
education, civilian occupation, marital status, and component of the army for 8,706,394 military 
personnel who enlisted between 1938 and 1946.  Draftees are included in the sample, but officers 
are not.  These data were purchased in electronic form from the Electronic and Special Media 
Records Division of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), who created 
the dataset from the Army’s original computer punch cards. 
 
Adjutant General Final Report (U.S. Army Adjutant General, 1953).  This final report from 
includes tabulations and breakdowns of the battle casualties (including dead, wounded, captured, 
missing) and non-battle deaths of U.S. Army personnel from 1941 through 1946.  The two-way 
tabulations include different types of casualties and deaths by division, by theater, and by month 
of occurrence.  This dataset was used in earlier versions of this study to check totals and remains 
a valuable source to check totals and compare cross tabulations. 
 
 The Reading Room Data are treated as the main data source for fatalities.  In many cases, 
the year was cut off from the data of death in the original file; in these cases, a likely year was 
estimated based on the dates of death of other members of that unit. Dates of death that occurred 
outside the dates that the division was at sea were recoded to missing.  The airborne deaths were 
dropped and replaced with information from the U.S. Airborne in WWII website.  These 
airborne deaths were merged with the Reading Room Data, the ABMC Cemetery Files, and the 
WWII Honor Lists to obtain independent confirmation of the observations.  Non-combat deaths, 
deaths that were confirmed to have occurred in another unit, and deaths that could not be 
confirmed in another source were dropped.  Date of death was first taken from the Reading 
Room Data, then the airborne data, then the imputed Reading Room Data, then the ABMC data, 
then the Machine Records data, and finally the Remains Not Recovered Data.  The priority of the 
merge was determined based on the rates of agreement between the different sources.  The vast 
majority of date observations were taken from the Reading Room, airborne, imputed reading 
room, and ABMC data, which all have 95% or more agreement among the non-missing 
observations. 
 
B. Unit Locations 
 
The information on unit locations that is used in this study comes from a variety of 
sources, mainly secondary, such as atlases of WWII, orders of battle, and memoirs.   
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U.S. Unit Locations.  For each American ground division, Stanton’s (1984) U.S. Order of Battle 
in WWII contains a historical account of the cities visited on different dates.  Additional data on 
the 10th Mountain Division’s locations were obtained from Imbrie and Imbrie (2004).  For each 
WWII ground division that fought in the European or Mediterranean Theaters, these data were 
hand-entered into a spreadsheet of 1,565 different division-date-location combinations for 67 
U.S. divisions.  The geographic coordinates of different cities were obtained from Google Earth 
and from U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (2007), with all cases double-checked 
using Google Earth.  For cases in which multiple cities had the same name, the city was selected 
that was closest to the cities visited before and after.  Location was not known for most dates and 
divisions – for in-between dates, each division’s was interpolated assuming that longitude and 
latitude changed linearly at a constant speed from one location to the next.  The 1,565 total 
includes observations that were added to the data to insure that travel along a straight line would 
keep the observation on land. 
 
Non-U.S. Allied Unit Locations.  The Allied countries other than the U.S. whose divisions’ are 
tracked in these data include Australia (Haskew, 2009; Maughan, 1966; Natkiel, 1999; Pimlott, 
2006; Wikipedia, 2010a), Brazil (McCann, 1974; Moraeas, 1966) Canada (Copp, 2006; Natkiel, 
2006; Pimlott, 2006; Nicholson, 1956; Wikipedia, 2010b), France (including Algeria and 
Morocco, Natkiel, 2006; Pimlott, 2006; Stone, 1999, Wikipedia, 2010c), India (Joslen, 2009), 
New Zealand (Kay, 1967; Llewellyn, 1949; McKinney, 1952; Natkiel, 2006; Phillips, 1957;  
Pimlott, 2006; Wikipedia, 2010d), Poland (Copp 2006; Natkiel, 2006; Nicholson, 1956; Pimlott, 
2006), South Africa (Joslen, 2009; Pimlott, 2006), and the United Kingdom (Joslen, 2009).  
These sources include published orders of battle, official histories, atlases of WWII, and some 
online sources.  Countries such as Greece that only provided non-divisional units or those such 
as Czechoslovakia or the Philippines that did not serve on the Western front are excluded from 
the analysis.  Italy, which had only a limited military presence in the Allies following its 
withdrawal from the Axis, is also excluded.  The approaches for identifying the coordinates and 
imputing are the same as for the U.S. divisions. 
 
Axis Unit Locations.  German and Italian force locations were obtained from a variety of sources, 
among them published orders of battle, unit histories, memoirs, and atlases of WWII (Axis 
History Factbook, 2009; Bishop and McNab, 2003; Dupuy, 1962; Dupuy, Bongard, and 
Anderson, 1994; Evans, 2002; Howe, 1993; Jordan and Wiest, 2004; Keegan, 2006; Kurowski, 
1995; Messenger, 1989; H. Meyer, 2005; K. Meyer, 2005; Mitcham, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2007d, 1985; Natkiel, 2006; Pimlott, 2006; Terry and Cole, 2001a, 2001b; von Luck, 1989, von 
Mellenthin, 1956; Zetterling, 2000).  The German list of divisions was obtained from Mitcham 
(2007a, 2007b, 2007c, and 2007d), and the Italian list of divisions was obtained from Axis 
History Factbook (2009).  In many cases, divisions’ locations were identified from a higher level 
of organization such as the Army or corps together with information from Axis History Factbook 
(2009) on the Axis Army’s organizational structure.  A total 5,082 different division-location 
combinations were obtained from these sources, with coordinates identified and in between 
locations imputed in the same way as for the Allied divisions.  Vichy France was not included in 




C. Geographic Variables 
 
 The key geographic variables used in the division by day panel are those measuring 
terrain, weather, and vegetation.  Additionally, the cost distance tool in ArcGIS was used to 
determine land distances from one location to another. 
 
Terrain (U.S. Geological Survey, 2005).  Elevation data for Europe and North Africa were 
obtained from U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2005).  These data were compiled by NASA and 
USGS from space shuttle photographs taken in 2000 and consist of elevation values at points 
spaced 3 arc seconds (roughly 90 meters) apart from one another along a grid.  The slope at a 
given point is calculated using the slope tool in ArcGIS.  This tool measures the change in 
elevation (in degrees) between each point and its eight neighbors (north, northeast, etc.) and 
returns the steepest (up or down) of these eight different slopes.  This slope variable is 
commonly used by geographers as a measure of the difficulty of traveling over terrain in a given 
area. 
 
Weather (Mitchell and Jones, 2005).  Historical weather data are taken from the Climactic 
Research Unit’s CRU TS 2.1 Global Climate Database.  These data measure near-surface mean 
temperature, precipitation, number of wet days, and other variables by month and year at the 0.5 
x 0.5-coordinate level for the entire world going back to 1901.  The set of weather stations used 
to construct the data varies from year to year, and imputation and climate modeling is used to fill 
in missing observations.  In addition to the imputation used to construct the data, an additional 
549 observations in the division by day panel required imputing the weather variables as 
averages of the neighboring cells that month. 
 
Vegetation (Goldewijk, 2001).  The vegetation data used in this study are estimates that were 
compiled by the author of the dataset for every fifty years from historical surveys such as tax 
records and land surveys.  The data place each 0.5 x 0.5-coordinate cell into one of twenty land 
use categories based on the amount of vegetation.  The 1950 data are used for the current study.  
The “cultivated land” dummy used in the division by day panel is one of the twenty categories, 
and the “wooded or mixed” dummy indicates whether that 0.5 by 0.5-coordinate cell was in one 
of the eight land cover categories whose description included the word “wood” or “forest.” 
  
IV. Engagement Data 
 
 The engagement data used in this study are the result of a long-term data compilation 
effort by The Dupuy Institute and its predecessor organization, the Historical Evaluation and 
Research Organization (HERO) that began in the 1960s.  The Dupuy Institute’s Division-Level 
Engagement Database (DLEDB) is a cleaned and expanded version of an earlier database 
entitled the Land Warfare Database (LWDB).  Both datasets include a large number of battles 
from antiquity to the present and have been analyzed as a set by a handful of economists and 
operations researchers including Hartley (2001), Helmbold (1993), and Rotte and Schmidt 
(2003).  The data are described in detail in The Dupuy Institute (2001a, 2005).  Additionally, the 
dataset as a whole and many specific observations are described in greater detail and examined 
from the perspective of quantitative historians in sources such as Dupuy (1985, 1987, 1995), 
Lawrence (1996, 1997), and The Dupuy Institute (2000, 2001b, 2004b).  The LWDB is publicly 
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available as a CD-ROM in the back of Hartley (2001).  The DLEDB is proprietary and may be 
purchased from The Dupuy Institute. 
 
 One of the key variables from the engagement data used in this study that appears both in 
the DLEDB and in the LWDB is the subjective index of mission accomplishment.  Figure A2 
shows the worksheet used to calculate this zero to one mission accomplishment index.  As the 
figure shows, each unit is scored on five criteria.  The first three criteria relate to specific mission 
objectives.  These include conceptual accomplishment (a general evaluation of achievement of 
mission objectives), geographical accomplishment (i.e., kilometers advanced), and block hostile 
mission.  Together, these objective-based scores can range from zero to six.  In addition to these 
three objective-based measures, the index incorporates general evaluations of the performance of 
officers and enlisted men.  Together these general evaluations can range from zero to four points.  
In principle, each side’s mission accomplishment can be evaluated separately and ranges from 
zero to ten.  In practice, attacker and defender mission accomplishment are nearly perfectly 
negatively correlated.  Mission accomplishment ratings do not exceed nine for either side for the 
162 engagements used from the DLEDB.  The measure of mission accomplishment used in this 
study and in the previous section is (U.S. total score –German total score)/16. 
 
One limitation of this subjective mission accomplishment measure is that it assigns equal 
weight to each of the five criteria.  Ideally, it would be possible to vary the weights for these 
criteria depending on their relative importance in different missions.  Another possible limitation 
of this subjective mission accomplishment measure is the emphasis on troops.  Command and 
staff performance and troop performance are both rated separately from accomplishment of 
specific objectives.  No such rating exists, however, for the performance of capital.  Given the 
available measures, this subjective index appears to be the best way to quantify mission 
accomplishment. 
 
V. Cost Calculations 
 
As discussed in the text of the paper, the per troop and per tank cost estimates are derived 
from estimates of the cost of raising and operating an organic infantry and armored division 
according to the 1942 configurations.  These costs take into account pay, training, capital 
expenses, depreciation, food, clothing, gasoline, ammunition, and transportation.  The costs 
calculated here include all costs incurred between the activation of a division and its return from 
overseas, including the return trip.  These estimates omit many overhead expenditures such as 
planning and research and development.  While all the Army divisions benefited from these 
expenditures, these costs do not have to be paid again when replacing a division. 
 
Table A13 shows estimated total wartime costs for infantry and armored divisions that 
spent typical amounts of time abroad.  All cost estimates are expressed in 2009 dollars and are 
converted using the Consumer Price Index.  The costs shown in Table A13 are calculated using 
separate estimates of a typical division’s fixed costs plus additional costs per months abroad.  For 
most major expenditure categories, these estimated costs are very similar for infantry and 
armored divisions.  The biggest cost differences between the two types of divisions are for 
equipment and transportation.  For an infantry division, equipment costs totaled $119.80 million 
initially plus $4.30 million per month abroad.  For an infantry division, equipment cost about ten 
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times as much at $1.114 billion initially plus $71.00 million per month abroad.  For a 10.8-month 
deployment, we find that a 1942 organic infantry division cost $1.43 billion and a 1942 organic 
armored division cost $4.10 billion. 
 
Dates of Service and Dates Abroad 
 
Activation and de-activation dates and dates abroad for each division are taken from 
Stanton (1984, pp. 47-182).  The number of months in the theater for the average division is 
computed from the division by day panel as 10.76.  The average number of days in the theater 
for the average division is computed as 298.8.  
 
Pay and Allowances 
 
 To compute pay rates for different soldiers, official pay scales are used from the Pay 
Readjustment Act of 1942 (U.S. Congress, 1942).  This document provides the pay scales for 
military personnel based on rank, tenure, and special circumstances (e.g., additional skills or 
overseas service).  Assumptions about skills are described later in this appendix.  The rank 
composition of infantry and armored divisions is obtained from Hays (2004, 2002). 
 
 Because pay depends on tenure, a level of tenure is assumed for each troop.  These 
assumptions about tenure have little effect on the final cost figures but are necessary to obtain 
wage estimates.  The vast majority of officers and enlisted men who fought in World War II 
were inducted from civilian life (Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 1991, pp. 91-92).  However, the 
higher-ranking officers were typically career military.  It is assumed that men in the core officer 
cadre (described below) had the average tenure levels for their ranks.  It is assumed that other 
officers and enlisted men had zero tenure when they underwent training.  After training was 
complete, it is supposed that all these troops had the average tenure levels for their ranks.  It is 
also assumed that the division had this same post-training tenure composition throughout the life 
of the unit.  Average tenure levels for officers are estimated using average pay data from U.S. 
War Department Bureau of the Budget (1946).  Given average pay and the formula relating pay 
to tenure (from U.S. Congress, 1946), average tenure levels are imputed for each rank.  A similar 
exercise is performed for enlisted men using average pay data from U.S. Army Office of the 
Comptroller (1953).  Using pay scales from U.S. Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(2006), average tenure for enlisted men is estimated by rank for 1953.  These 1946 and 1953 
average tenure levels are used to proxy for average tenure in 1942, the year of interest. 
 
 During World War II, retirement pay was limited to officers who had served for at least 
10 years (U.S. Congress, 1942, pg. 368, U.S. Congress, pg. 773).  These men would have 
probably been employed in the absence of the war.  Veterans’ benefits were expanded later on, 
but it is likely that these changes were unanticipated at the time that the troops were procured.  






Initial (pre-departure) training expenditure calculations begin with the January 1942 plan 
for activation of an infantry division (Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 1991, pp. 433-441).  This plan 
specifies the lengths of time spent in training for all 15,514 troops in an organic infantry division.  
It is assumed that the sequence of events in activation and training was the same for armored as 
for infantry divisions.  A division usually began with a cadre of trained, high ranking officers 
taken from other “parent” divisions.  For infantry divisions, this cadre included 172 officers.16  
Given the larger numbers of high ranking officers in an armored division, it is assumed that the 
armored officer cadre included 183 officers.17   
 
The high ranking officers within a division acted as instructors for most of the division’s 
training.  This training included both basic instruction and field exercises performed at camps 
throughout the U.S.  Palmer, Wiley, and Keast suggest that the typical training period for a 
division was 38 weeks (Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 1991, pp. 440-441, 481).  Data from Stanton 
indicate that 789 and 803 days passed between activation and departure overseas for armored and 
infantry divisions, respectively (Stanton, 1984 pp. 47-182).  Hence, the divisions spent a 
considerable amount of time after training simply shuffling around and waiting to depart.18  The 
personnel costs in Table A13 include wages paid during this idle time.  Most of the division’s 
pre-debarkation wages are included as personnel costs in Table A13, even when the personnel 
worked as instructors.19 
 
The total costs of division field exercises are calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Budget 
(1940-1947).20  The cost per set of maneuvers is estimated by dividing this total cost across all 
divisions in proportion to their participation.  Stanton (1984) reports the dates in which each 
division participated in field exercises.  The average armored and non-armored divisions 
participated in 1.6 and 2.0 sets of combat maneuvers, respectively.  It is assumed that the 
armored: infantry cost ratio for field exercises was 1.25, the same as for replacement training 
camps.  Estimates of replacement training camp costs are described later in the appendix.   
 
                                                            
16 Later in 1942, the activation schedule was changed slightly, and a greater proportion of officers were hired for the 
pre-trained cadre (Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 1991, pp. 436-438).  Accounting for such changes would have only a 
minor effect on our estimated costs. 
17 This estimate is obtained by assuming that the ratio of cadre to other officers was the same as for the infantry 
division. 
18 Brown (1986, pp. 164-167) describes this process in further detail. 
19 For training before the division was activated (e.g., basic enlisted training, Officer Candidate School), trainee 
wages are included in the cost of training.  It is supposed that basic training for enlisted men and officers occurred 
prior to activation of the division.  Hence, the total costs of basic, officer, and Command and General Staff training 
include the wages and allowances paid to trainees.  Advanced training appears to have frequently taken place after 
the activation of the division (Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 1991, pg. 265).  Hence, these men would have been 
employed by the division if they were not receiving the training.  The cost of advanced training estimated here 
excludes trainees’ wages and allowances.  It is supposed that troops held the rank of Private during basic enlisted 
training and Private First Class during officer candidate training.  It is supposed that they held the rank of Second 
Lieutenant during Command and General Staff Training.  During all other training, it is supposed that the trainees 
held their ultimate ranks within the division. 
20 These estimates exclude the costs of additional military personnel who worked at the training camps.  From 
preliminary investigations, It was determined that these additional costs are negligible.  
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 All the officers and some of the enlisted men received training prior to the activation of 
the division.21  Every officer received both basic enlisted training and some form of basic officer 
candidate training.  The higher ranking enlisted men received basic enlisted training before 
joining the division.  Roughly 33% of the officers and roughly 6% of the enlisted men also 
received advanced training in some special skill.22  Troops within the division served different 
functions (e.g., Artillery, Infantry, Quartermaster), and each troop attended schools particular to 
his branch.  Data on the breakdown of infantry and armored divisions by branch are taken from 
Hays (2004, 2002) and Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley (1947, pp. 320-321). 
 
 Next, the lengths and types of training are estimated for each troop.  Troops were 
generally processed through induction stations and reception centers.  Each of these processes 
lasted a day or two (U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1945a).  From early in mobilization until April 
1943, basic enlisted training lasted 13 weeks.  Officer candidate school also typically lasted 
about 13 weeks during this period.  By late 1943, both types of schooling had been lengthened to 
17 weeks (Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, 1991, pp. 332, 358, 382-385).  For the purposes of this 
analysis, it is assumed that the divisions’ initial troops received the shorter, 13-week training.  
Replacement troops are assumed to have received the longer training.  Specialist courses varied 
in length.  For each troop, it is assumed that specialist training lasted the average length for 
enlisted or officers for that branch.  These average lengths are calculated using course lengths 
and output data from Palmer, Wiley and Keast (1991, pp. 309-319).23  Some specialist course 
lengths are also taken from U.S. Army Ground Forces (1947).  It is also supposed that the 
divisions’ highest ranking officers attended Fort Leavenworth’s 10-week Command and General 
Staff course.24 
 
 Next, the cost per week of training is estimated for different types of training.  Estimates 
of the cost per week of officer training are obtained from U.S. Army Ground Forces (1947).  
This report consists of an itemized accounting of different types of training given to Chinese 
officers in 1947.  This report includes the estimated costs and lengths for a variety of courses in 
                                                            
21 The original officer cadre included officers who had already received training for other purposes.  These officers 
were often taken from other “parent divisions.”  The cost of the division does not include the cost of training these 
officers.  However, the division was responsible for training replacements for the officer cadre in their parent 
divisions.  These replacement training costs are included in the cost of the division. 
22 It is supposed that advanced training went to higher ranking officers and enlisted men and to the ranks with 
“technical” in the title.  Both the 33% and 6% figures are rough approximations based on a variety of figures 
(Palmer, Wiley, and Keast 1991, pp. 249, 266, 279, 308-319).  For an enlisted man who learned a special skill, the 
Army paid an additional allowance.  It is assumed here that this bonus coincided with taking the enlisted advanced 
courses. 
23 For the Officer Candidate School basic training, total training costs include the cost of training students who did 
not graduate.  These costs are added in by scaling the course length by the branch-specific graduation rate.  Data on 
graduation rates are obtained for the branches of the ground arms (e.g., Artillery, Armor, Infantry) from Keast 
(1946, pp. 27-34).  Data on the overall graduation rate of the service branches (e.g., Ordnance, Signal, 
Quartermaster) are obtained from U.S. Army Service Forces (1954, pg. 224).  We assume that the Command and 
General Staff graduation rate equaled the average graduation rate for basic officer courses in the ground arms.  For 
the basic enlisted training, it is assumed that the induction centers effectively screened enlisted men, and that the 
graduation rate was 100%.  For advanced courses, it is assumed that the knowledge (rather than the degree) was 
relevant for division effectiveness, and hence pass rates are ignored. 
24 During World War II, the typical 1- to 2-year course was abbreviated to 10 weeks (Partin, 1983). 
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ground arms, service branches, and Command and General Staff.25  It is assumed that the 
advanced specialist courses cost as much for enlisted men as for officers.  To estimate the cost 
per week for basic enlisted training, these costs are combined with data from a few different 
sources.26  Some minor imputation was required in calculating each of breakdown by branch, 
course lengths, and cost per week. 
 
 In addition to the initial mobilization strength, each division received replacement troops 
when it lost troops due to casualties or other separations.  The cost of regular replacements of 
troops is estimated by combining the above pay and training estimates with data on separations.  
Casualty rates, separation rates, and returns to duty (among casualties) are measured separately 
for officers and enlisted men from a handful of sources.  For separations other than casualties, 
the cost of replacements is included in the monthly cost of operating a division overseas.  Data 
on the rate of separations are obtained from U.S. Army Service Forces (1954, pp. 200, 206-209).  
Data on the rate of casualties (minus returns-to-duty) are obtained from U.S. Army Adjutant 
General (1953, pg. 5).  Using these data, the monthly rates of non-casualty separations are 
calculated separately for officers and enlisted men.  Within each enlisted/officer and branch 
combination, it is assumed that replacements took specialist courses at the same rate as the 
division’s original troops.  However, replacements generally did not receive divisional training 
or participate in maneuvers.  For casualty replacements, the casualty rate per branch is estimated 
from a handful of sources.27  Using these pay and training data, the replacement cost per casualty 
is estimated to be $6,400.  This cost of replacing casualties is not included in the estimated costs 
of the divisions.  Death benefits and funeral and cemetery expenses were negligible compared to 




 Quantities of equipment for organic infantry and armored divisions are taken from Hays 
(2004, 2002).  Purchase prices for each item are taken from U.S. Army price lists (U.S. Army 
Air Forces, 1945; U.S. Army Service Forces (1942a, 1942b, 1943a, 1943b, 1943c, 1944a; U.S. 
                                                            
25 We also constructed our own estimates of the average training costs per pupil based on the schools’ non-personnel 
budgets and the total personnel.  Our estimates are slightly larger than these cost estimates, but are generally of the 
same order of magnitude.  The Army Ground Forces data are used for the final estimates, because they exhibited 
less variance and required fewer assumptions. 
26 For each branch, it is assumed that the non-labor cost per pupil was the same for officer training as for enlisted 
training.  Non-labor costs for the officer candidate schools are obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Budget (1940-
1947).  It is then assumed that the personnel cost per pupil was proportional to the number of personnel per pupil in 
each school.  The personnel per pupil for enlisted and officer schools are obtained from U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
(1945a through 1945d).  It is supposed that the labor cost per employee was the same for these schools as for the 
corresponding branch of officer training.  For the service branches, data on non-labor costs were not readily 
available.  It is assumed that the non-labor cost per pupil in the Signal Corps was the same as for Field Artillery.  It 
is also assumed that the non-labor cost per pupil for Ordnance and the Quartermaster Corps were the same as for 
Infantry.  For the Medical Corps, the personnel to student ratio was very similar for basic enlisted and enlisted 
specialist schools.  Consequently, it is assumed that the cost per trainee week was the same for officers and enlisted 
men.  For Military Police and Engineer Corps, personnel to student ratios are not readily available for both officer 
and enlisted courses.  For these two branches, it is assumed that the cost per trainee week was the same for enlisted 
men as for officers. 
27 U.S. Army Adjutant General (1953), pg. 5.  Palmer, Wiley, and Keast (1991), pg. 49.  U.S. Army Service Forces 
(1954), pg. 123.  Some branches aggregated.  Some minor imputation required.  It is supposed that the ratio of 
enlisted to officer casualties was constant across the different ground arms and service branches. 
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Army Services of Supply 1942a, 1942b).  These prices are adjusted using branch-specific 
monthly procurement price indices from Crawford and Cook (1953, pg. 82).  Depreciation rates 
for specific capital items are taken from U.S. Army Service Forces (1943d, 1944b, 1944c) 
estimates.  These depreciation rates take into account tank losses both in and out of combat.28  In 
many cases, Army Service Forces estimated separate depreciation rates for different theaters.  
When separate depreciation rates were available for the Mediterranean and European Theaters of 
Operations, an average of the two rates was used.  When this was not possible, depreciation rates 
were used for the overall Western Front or for the entire overseas army.  Maintenance and loss 
data from overseas were limited, and these estimated depreciation rates are at best very rough 
approximations.  In a small handful of cases, the price or depreciation rate for a specific item was 
not available.  In these cases, the data for similar items were used.  For the 38 weeks of division 
training, it is supposed that equipment depreciated at the reported rates for the Continental U.S.  
This depreciation is counted as a cost of training in Table A13.  For the remaining idle time 
before debarkation, it is supposed that equipment did not depreciate. 
 
 The effects of division type on tank losses in Table A6 are notable because they are used 
in the cost calculations.  For the average combat day in the engagement data, 3.4 out of 125 U.S. 
tanks were lost in combat.  The percentage lost in a combat day was 1.1% and 2.8% for pre- and 
post-reorganization infantry and was 3.5% and 4.6% for pre- and post-reorganization armored.  
To translate these figures into estimated losses per month, we multiply these percent losses by 
the number of days in the engagement sample that a unit would be expected to experience over a 
month.  We then scale the losses upward to account for tank losses that occurred on days that are 
not in the engagement sample.  Because tank loss data are only available in the engagement 
sample, we perform a scaling using the fatalities data – measuring the fraction of deaths 
attributable to engagement days.  This same scaling is used to construct the U.S. KIA bar graphs 
and the isoquant graphs in the main paper.  To perform the scaling, we multiply the percentage 
of tanks lost by 298.803 (the number of days in a typical deployment) times 0.0146544 (the 
fraction of division days included in the engagement sample) and we divide by the product of 
0.0589803 (the fraction of deaths accounted for by the engagement sample) and 10.75758 (the 
number of months in a typical deployment).  For the infantry divisions, this calculation produces 
monthly loss rates of 7.83% pre-reorganization and 19.3% post-reorganization.  For the armored 
divisions, this calculation produces monthly loss rates of 24.0% pre-reorganization and 31.7% 
post-reorganization.  The differences between pre- and post-reorganization types are largely due 
to the more intense combat and higher tank losses experienced in the ETO than in the 
Mediterranean Theater.  Considering pre- and post-reorganization together, we estimate monthly 
tank losses of 11.2% for the infantry division and 29.8% for the armored division.  Army Service 
Forces varied its tank loss estimates over the course of the war based on the higher than 
anticipated loss rates; these figures are roughly in line with their end-of-war estimated loss rate 
of 20% (Smith, 1959, pp. 189-91).  Given the lower percentage of armored divisions in the 
theater, the observed tank loss rates fall slightly below this 20% figure; however, the loss rates 
from the engagement data do not take into account standard wear and tear and tank losses that 
                                                            
28 Constant monthly depreciation rates are assumed, as U.S. Army Service Forces did when determining 
replacement requirements.  These depreciation rates take into account tank losses from combat.  Simply using tank 
loss rates from the engagement data would fail to account for tank losses out of combat.  Moreover, the engagement-
level tank loss data do not specify the degree of damage or reparability.  These constant monthly depreciation rates 
appear to be the most accurate way to account for tank losses. 
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did not occur during combat (which probably occurred more frequently than non-combat 
fatalities).  To adjust for this deficiency, the monthly depreciation rates from Army Service 
Forces are revised upwards in the tank loss estimates, and a 15% monthly depreciation rate is 
assumed for tanks in infantry divisions, and a 35% monthly depreciation rate is assumed for 
armored divisions. 
 
Food, Clothing, Gasoline, and Ammunition 
 
 The food, clothing, gasoline, and ammunition costs estimated here rely on historical U.S. 
Army cost studies.  Estimates of a single troop’s food requirements are taken from U.S. War 
Department Public Relations Division (1946).  Clothing and additional equipment estimates are 
taken from U.S. Army Office of the Quartermaster General (1944).29  Both per troop estimates 
are then multiplied by the number of men in each type of division.  Monthly overseas 
ammunition cost estimates for a 1942 armored and infantry division are obtained from U.S. 
Army Services of Supply (1943, pg. 30).  Monthly overseas gasoline requirements for a 1942 
armored and infantry division are obtained from U.S. Army Service Forces (1943a).30  Gasoline 




 Transportation costs are estimated separately for troops and for capital items from the 
travel and transportation portions of the U.S. defense budget (Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, 
1947, pg. 203; U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1940 to 1947).31  These expenses are divided by the 
total numbers of people and tons shipped overseas to obtain average costs per person and per ton 
(U.S. Army Service Forces, 1954, pp. 116, 123).  Hence, it is assumed that the per person and 
per ton transport costs were the same for the Pacific and Western Fronts.  These costs include the 
total expenditures incurred by the Transportation Corps for inter- and intra-continental transport 
for people and items shipped overseas.  Given all these assumptions, the total transportation cost 
per ton shipped overseas is estimated to be $880 in 2009 dollars.   The total transportation cost 
per troop who traveled overseas is estimated to be $3,600. 
 
 The total weight of infantry and armored divisions’ equipment is taken from U.S. Army 
Service Forces (1943a).  Two-way trips are assumed for initial troops and equipment, and one-
way trips are assumed for replacements.  It is assumed that maintenance shipments had the same 
weight per dollar of expenditure as the initial shipments did.  In addition to regular purchases, 
Army supply plans included a 4.5-month store of reserves.32  Hence, 4.5 months of equipment, 
                                                            
29 These Quartermaster General estimates include both initial costs and monthly maintenance costs.  These totals 
include “additional equipment” such as canteens, flashlights, etc.  These costs are added to the “Equipment” 
category in Table A13.  As suggested by the study, the estimates here add 25% of the initial costs for reserve 
requirements. 
30  These studies do not report monthly ammunition or gasoline requirements for units still in the U.S.  To compute 
U.S. rates, it is supposed that the ratio of gasoline and ammunition usage to capital depreciation was the same as it 
was overseas. 
31 Personnel costs for the Transportation and Quartermaster Corps are calculated assuming that employees in these 
branches received the average Army pay rates. 
32 Supplies ran very low near the end of the war.  As Anderson (2000) describes, to supply units in the field, some 
divisions were stripped of their equipment as soon as they arrived overseas.  Hence, the true amounts of reserves 
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gasoline, and ammunition are added to the fixed cost of each division type.  Costs are also 
adjusted for 2% shipping losses for all equipment, as suggested in Herbert and Richards (1943, 
pg. 21).33 
 
Numbers of Troops and Tanks 
 
The standard numbers of troops and tanks for each division type varied over time and are 
illustrated in Figure A3.  The solid black line in panel A shows the number of troops for an 
armored division, the dashed line shows the number for an infantry division, and the solid gray 
line shows the number for an airborne division.  The standard numbers of tanks are plotted in 
panel B; however, only the solid black line for the armored division is visible, because no tanks 
were allotted to the standard infantry or airborne divisions.  The numbers for Figure A3 come 
from Hays (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004) and many were confirmed in Stanton (1984) and Wilson 
(1998). 
 
To measure the numbers of troops and tanks once attachments are taken into account, the 
full attachment histories are taken from U.S. Army ETO (1945), which lists each U.S. division’s 
history of attachments and detachments over its time in the European Theater.  For each of the 
different platoons, companies, troops, squadrons, battalions, and regiments that were attached 





maintained overseas may have fell considerably lower than this 4.5 months figure.  Denson and Wood (1943, pg. 
21).  One additional cost of reserves is the cost of storage space.  A preliminary examination of storage costs 
revealed that they were negligible.  Sources: Hamilton (1953), pg. 28; U.S. Army Ground Forces (1945); U.S. Army 
Service Forces (1943e), pp. 27-B to 29-B; U.S. Army Service Forces (1954, pp. 106-110).  U.S. War Department 
Office of the Budget Officer (1943). 
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Figure A1: Estimated Costs, Fatalities, and Military Production Isoquants by Division Type, 
Estimates from Corps-Level Regressions 
Panel A: Corps-Level Regressions, No Controls 
 
 
Panel B: Corps-Level Regressions with Controls 
 
 
Notes to Figure A1: These figures are the corps-level counterparts to those shown in Figure 3.  
The fatality and km figures are the coefficients on the number of divisions of that type in each 
corps that day.  Sample includes corps days in which one or more Axis divisions were in same 
the cell as the average division in that corps.  Additional details in the text.
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Assessment date: ____________  Assessor’s Initials: _______ 
 
 
Attacker      Defender 
 
Unit:______________________ Unit: _____________________ 
 
 
Conceptual Accomplishment:  0 Conceptual Accomplishment:  0 
1      1 
2      2 
 
Geographical Accomplishment: 0 Geographical Accomplishment: 0 
1      1 
2      2 
 
Block Hostile Missions:  0 Block Hostile Mission:  0 
1      1 
2      2 
 
Command & Staff Performance: 0  Command & Staff Performance: 0 
1      1 
2      2 
 
Troop Performance:   0 Troop Performance:   0 
1      1 
2      2 
 
 
Bonus or Penalty:    Bonus or Penalty: 
Explain:     Explain: 
 
 
Total Score: _______   Total Score: _______ 
 
Notes to Figure A2: The 0-1 index of U.S. Mission Accomplishment used in this study is calculated as the 




Figure A3: Numbers of Troops and Tanks in an Organic U.S. Army 
Armored, Infantry, and Airborne Division, 1940-1945 
Panel A: Numbers of Troops 
 
 
Panel B: Numbers of Tanks 
 
Notes to Figure A3: “Organic” indicates the numbers specified in the U.S. Army Tables of 
Organization and Equipment and ignores attached or detached battalions, combat losses, and 
replacement troops.  Sources: Hays (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). 
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Table A3: Estimated Combat Outcomes and Costs Over a 10.8-Month Deployment by Division Type 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Division by Day Panel Engagement Data 
Division Type and Variable 
Axis Divisions 
in Cell ≥ 1 U.S. KIA ≥ 5 By Division Type 




1. Km Advanced 1.929 1.802 3.384 2.964 0.978 1.146 1.994 2.089 
2. Mission Success 0.764 0.699 0.692 0.626 
3. U.S. Deaths 1,059 834.0 1,346 1,255 2,297 -500.7 2,624 561.4 
4. Cost (billions) $4.20 $4.20 $4.20 $4.20 $5.14 $5.14 $4.20 $4.20 
Infantry Division 
5. Km Advanced 1.058 0.768 1.513 2.946 0.587 0.436 0.572 0.596 
6. Mission Success 0.510 0.607 0.520 0.547 
7. U.S. Deaths 2,120 1,692 1,796 1,581 1,453 3,543 1,640 2,294 
8. Cost (billions) $1.92 $1.92 $1.92 $1.92 $2.20 $2.20 $1.92 $1.92 
Airborne Division 
9. Km Advanced 1.985 2.222 -0.021 0.105 0.460 0.427 
10. Mission Success 0.489 0.448 
11. U.S. Deaths 3,948 2,935 2,302 1,982 1,436 2,024 
12. Cost (billions) $1.03 $1.03 $1.03 $1.03 $1.03 $1.03 
Post-Reorganization 
Armored Division 
13. Km Advanced 1.706 1.931 3.699 3.407 1.923 2.980 1.758 2.073 
14. Mission Success 0.569 0.573 0.648 0.572 
15. U.S. Deaths 1,116 1,326 1,225 1,160 2,311 -1,011 2,266 768 
16. Cost (billions) $2.90 $2.90 $2.90 $2.90 $2.93 $2.93 $2.90 $2.90 
Infantry Division 
17. Km Advanced 1.072 1.086 1.848 1.720 1.228 1.116 0.656 0.683 
18. Mission Success 0.590 0.481 0.529 0.544 
19. U.S. Deaths 1,822 1,904 1,839 1,901 1,967 613 1,685 2,157 
20. Cost (billions) $2.00 $2.00 $2.00 $2.00 $2.29 $2.29 $2.00 $2.00 
Airborne Division 
21. Km Advanced 1.574 1.472 0.874 1.764 -2.090 0.579 0.598 
22. Mission Success 0.613 0.512 0.501 
23. U.S. Deaths 2,284 1,837 2,352 1,950 4,513 1,570 2,091 
24. Cost (billions) $1.54 $1.54 $1.54 $1.54 $2.49 $2.49 $1.54 $1.54 
  Controls?   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Notes to Table A3: Estimates are the same as those presented in graphical form in the main text.  
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Notes to Table A4: Each cost per life saved estimates the cost of implementing one of the policies suggested plus 
partially implementing the second one the exact fraction of the amount necessary to hold success constant (measured 
as km success in the division by day data and the subjective index in the engagement data).  Details in the text.
Table A4: Cost per Life Saved and Lives Saved from Effectiveness-Neutral Combinations of Policies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Division by Day Panel Engagement Data 
Variable 
Axis Divisions in Cell 
≥ 1 U.S. KIA ≥ 5 By Division Type 
Troop & Tank 
Regressions 
Replace Infantry with Armored plus Partial Armored Reorganization 
Cost per Life Saved -$3.328 $2.643 -$37.26 $7.224 -$0.119 $0.424 -$10.21 $0.394 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (22.58) (1.212)** (324.2) (18.19) (0.534) (0.429) (24.69) (0.900) 
Lives Saved 837.1 4,807 -267.9 322.7 -577.5 3,030 271.2 966.4 
(1,015) (26,666) (3,231) (334.0) (907.8) (805.6) (653.7) (565.4)* 
Infantry Reorganization plus Partial Replace Infantry with Armored 
Cost per Life Saved $0.210 $0.601 $0.533 $3.355 -$2.072 $0.262 -$6.832 $0.927 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (1.606) (1.128) (1.925) (5.506) (4.356) (0.099)** (80.72) (0.493)* 
Lives Saved 281.4 -430.0 -154.0 218.2 -1,217 3,538.2 -2.371 206.4 
(475.9) (614.9) (332.5) (516.1) (2,536) (1,154)** (27.97) (319.5) 
Replace Infantry with Airborne plus Partial Airborne Reorganization 
Cost per Life Saved $0.134 $0.109 $0.029 $0.053 -$15.13 $0.631 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (0.631) (0.811) (2.305) (2.107) (138.7) (0.452) 
Lives Saved 1,930 885.7 -592.7 -346.2 12.15 98.58 
(8,069) (2,561) (558.6) (506.1) (111.4) (53.46)*
Infantry Reorganization plus Replace Infantry with Airborne 
Cost per Life Saved $0.300 -$1.720 $0.357 $7.608 -$0.110 -$18.79 $1.359 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (0.787) (5.878) (1.229) (38.69) (0.062)* (260.2) (0.775)* 
Lives Saved 351.0 815.2 -216.8 -11,284 5,745 7.796 86.86 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (1,423) (3,073) (515.6) (171,851) (9,467) (108.3) (47.13)* 
Replace Airborne with Armored plus Partial Armored Reorganization 
Cost per Life Saved $1.201 -$2.144 -$48.99 $96.79 -$9.203 -$1.964 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (2.127) (88.25) (632.6) (2,150) (18.14) (2.629) 
Lives Saved 2,904 497.8 -350.9 119.4 304.3 563.7 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (285.3)** (9,256) (5,738) (2,395) (594.1) (514.7) 
Airborne Reorganization plus Partial Replace Airborne with Armored 
Cost per Life Saved $1.205 $4.385 -$0.197 $0.772 -$22.66 $0.716 
(millions of 2009 dollars) (0.680)* (8.436) (3.849) (1.374) (330.2) (0.472) 
Lives Saved 3,942 622.1 -400.1 -1,118 -12.51 -704.7 
(20,730) (1,825) (1,104) (1,597) (182.3) (589.9) 
Controls?   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
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Notes to Table A5: Within each panel, each column shows results from a different OLS or fixed effects regression.  These regressions represent the first-stage estimates preceding 
the 2SLS estimates shown in Table 1 of the paper.  Additional details in the text. 
 
Table A5: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of the First Stage Effects of Division Type on Kilometers of Progress and U.S. KIA, Division by Day Panel 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Division Type Panel A: Dependent Variable is Kilometers of Progress Toward Berlin/Tunis/Messina 
Division Days in Which Axis Divisions in Cell ≥ 1 Division Days in Which U.S. KIA ≥ 5 
Full Sample     Full Sample     
Post-Reorganization -0.156 0.129 0.502 -5.245 -4.351 0.245 0.443 0.923 22.41 1.281 
* Armored (0.658) (0.677) (0.743) (4.285) (4.257) (0.820) (0.834) (0.837) (10.13)** (15.03) 
Post-Reorganization 0.169 0.319 0.062 -0.707 -2.961 -0.513 -1.226 0.886 2.844 2.940 
* Infantry (0.642) (0.693) (0.888) (0.987) (1.149)** (0.809) (0.894) (1.135) (1.410)** (1.796) 
Post-Reorganization -0.273 -0.751 -0.654 13.58 1.469 1.659 0.164 -51.67 71.00 
* Airborne (1.849) (1.986) (1.814) (21.44) (2.573) (2.688) (2.346) (38.39) (27.64)** 
Armored 0.943 1.035 1.176 -2.451 0.968 0.018 0.499 -1.112 
(0.762) (0.796) (1.061) (1.356)* (0.955) (1.005) (1.254) (1.777) 
Airborne 1.065 1.455 1.286 -2.536 -2.841 1.802 -34.75 
(1.895) (2.044) (1.923) (2.587) (2.723) (2.452) (27.20) 
R2 0.003 0.025 0.357 0.649 0.657 0.007 0.031 0.579 0.773 0.773 
  Panel B: Dependent Variable is U.S. Fatalities 
Post-Reorganization 5.914 7.333 -2.505 20.05 19.03 2.255 -1.357 1.500 11.88 21.59 
* Armored (4.051) (4.087)* (4.948) (45.06) (45.27) (2.369) (2.406) (3.279) (48.09) (71.21) 
Post-Reorganization -0.424 3.160 -26.61 -23.58 -30.29 7.736 4.617 -9.011 -1.246 -2.957 
* Infantry (3.951) (4.184) (5.917)** (10.38)** (12.21)** (2.336)** (2.578)* (4.449)** (6.695) (8.510) 
Post-Reorganization -29.80 -16.37 -14.39 -14.82 -4.146 -0.457 -12.173 289.2 96.18 
* Airborne (11.38)** (11.99) (12.08) (225.4) (7.433) (7.754) (9.195) (182.3) (131.0) 
Armored -17.02 -12.78 -37.97 -42.93 -2.197 -4.707 -18.043 -9.918 
(4.689)** (4.810)** (7.068)** (14.26)** (2.760) (2.899) (4.916)** (8.439) 
Airborne 30.44 18.52 -4.466 15.77 5.773 -2.426 -79.12 
(11.66)** (12.35) (12.81) (7.472)** (7.854) (9.613) (129.1) 
R2 0.054 0.108 0.285 0.466 0.467 0.038 0.070 0.248 0.335 0.340 
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & Year Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Axis Division Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
U.S. Division Fes Yes Yes 
N (Division Days) 4,430 1,137 4,579 1,221 
Clusters (Division Months) 470     115   516   137 
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Notes to Table A6: Within each panel, each column shows results from a different OLS regression.  The regressions in columns (1) to (4) (and scaled versions of 
the regressions in columns (7) and (8)) represent the first-stage estimates preceding the 2SLS estimates shown in the first few columns of Table 2 of the paper.  




Table A6: OLS Estimates of the First-Stage Effects of Division Type on Combat Outcomes, Engagement Data 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent Variable is . . . 
Variable 
Km Progress 
Along Axis of 
Advance 
Zero to One Index of 
Mission Success 
Indicator for U.S. 
Success (Draw = 0.5) U.S. KIA U.S. Tank Losses German KIA 
Post-Reorganiza- 0.426 1.852 -0.198 -0.111 -0.209 -0.140 4.294 -9.452 -4.918 -9.689 4.935 -2.893 
tion * Armored (1.160) (2.129) (0.036)** (0.089) (0.096)** (0.323) (12.01) (11.53) (7.850) (4.290)** (24.65) (27.10) 
Post-Reorganiza- -0.460 0.506 -0.023 -0.115 0.114 -0.235 -7.083 -31.03 3.346 0.979 -10.42 -20.99 
tion * Infantry (0.420) (0.736) (0.071) (0.046)** (0.163) (0.153) (7.373) (5.427)** (2.949) (3.589) (9.263) (12.61)* 
Armored -0.821 0.562 0.133 0.087 0.299 0.186 -7.121 -33.37 13.37 14.85 8.966 -13.68 
(1.027) (1.402) (0.072)* (0.085) (0.170)* (0.320) (12.36) (10.53)** (7.489)* (4.828)** (22.67) (22.62) 
Controls Include . . . 
Date & Continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enemy Inputs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Terrain & Weather Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Human Factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.076 0.453 0.186 0.597 0.144 0.514 0.083 0.531 0.383 0.649 0.231 0.482 
N (Division Days) 279 279 279  279  279  279  279  279  215  215  279  279  
Clusters (Engagements) 152 152 152  152  152  152  152 152 118  118  152  152  
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Notes to Table A7: Within each panel, each column shows results from a different OLS  or fixed effects regression.  
These regressions represent the first-stage estimates preceding the 2SLS estimates shown in the last few columns of 
Table 2 of the paper.  Additional details in the text. 
Table A7: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of the First Stage Effects of Troops and Tanks, Engagement Data 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Panel A: Dependent Variable is Km of Progress 
Full Sample   Fixed Effects Sample 
U.S. Troops/10,000 0.204 -0.010 -0.278 0.078 -0.208 -1.706 
(0.444) (0.568) (0.526) (0.513) (0.724) (1.393) 
U.S. Tanks/100 0.714 1.169 1.688 2.065 2.093 1.338 
(0.688) (0.800) (1.246) (1.550) (1.126)* (1.408) 
U.S. Troops * U.S.  -0.231 -0.404 -0.503 -0.486 -0.602 -0.026 
Tanks/1,000,000 (0.232) (0.294) (0.413) (0.390) (0.374) (0.288) 
R2 0.043 0.468 0.113 0.452 0.611 0.783 
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Zero to One Index of Mission Success 
U.S. Troops/10,000 0.033 0.127 0.013 0.051 0.118 0.179 
(0.032) (0.046)** (0.033) (0.036) (0.060)* (0.082)** 
U.S. Tanks/100 0.072 0.085 0.056 -0.070 0.085 -0.047 
(0.027)** (0.037)** (0.047) (0.060) (0.062) (0.090) 
U.S. Troops * U.S.  -0.020 -0.032 -0.013 0.015 -0.033 -0.009 
Tanks/1,000,000 (0.010)* (0.014)** (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.030) 
R2 0.187 0.594 0.143 0.579 0.542 0.749 
Panel C: Dependent Variable is U.S. KIA 
U.S. Troops/10,000 1.556 2.949 0.185 -15.09 8.066 23.12 
(6.600) (7.227) (8.813) (5.741)** (9.19) (9.527)** 
U.S. Tanks/100 1.135 -5.324 13.39 19.94 7.833 -5.359 
(6.152) (5.925) (10.48) (13.54) (7.883) (9.647) 
U.S. Troops * U.S.  -0.053 0.763 -3.832 -3.750 -4.198 -3.388 
Tanks/1,000,000 (2.409) (2.413) (3.596) (3.379) (3.046) (2.794) 
R2 0.077 0.436 0.105 0.386 0.509 0.638 
Controls Include . . . 
Date & Continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Enemy Inputs Yes Yes Yes 
Terrain & Weather Yes Yes Yes 
Human Factors Yes Yes Yes 
Axis Division Fes Yes Yes 
U.S. Division Fes Yes Yes 
N (Division Days) 289 289 225 225 225 225 
Clusters (Engagements) 162 162   132 132 132 132 
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Table A8: Corps by Day-Level 2SLS Estimates of the Cost Function for Military Operations, Collapsed Division by Day Panel 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Dependent Variable is Estimated Dollar Cost per Day in Millions of 2009 Dollars 
Variable 
All Division Type Indicators are Excluded Instruments  Armored and Airborne Indicators are Only Excluded Instruments 




                  
Km of 
Progress 10.23 -3.464 9.562 3.090 0.542 0.077 47.69 -10.84 19.90 53.65 -15.01 
(10.26) (3.970) (6.524) (2.538) (0.350) (0.068) (86.69) (12.15) (25.10) (204.5) (30.05) 
U.S. 
Fatalities -0.294 -0.043 -0.213 -0.075 -0.076 0.001 -0.851 -0.091 -1.046 0.521 -0.236 
(0.207) (0.090) (0.317) (0.119) (0.066) (0.003) (1.399) (0.233) (1.776) (3.206) (0.691) 
R2 -13.85 -0.662 -8.298 0.031 0.961 0.999 -316.9 -14.85 9.56 -288.5 -23.31 
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Axis Division FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
U.S. Corps FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
U.S. Division FEs Yes 
N (Corps Days) 1,024 801 1,024 801 
Clusters (Corps 
Months) 119     93   119   93 
Notes to Table A8: Each column shows results from a different corps by day-level 2SLS regression.  The specifications are the same as in Table 1, except that 
the data are organized at the corps by day level, the total number of divisions in the corps is a control variable, and the nearby Allied unit controls are replaced 
with controls for the other Allied units in the corps.  Additional details in the text.
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Notes to Table A9: This table reproduces estimates from Table 1 but with varying ways of clustering the standard 
errors.  Additional details in the text. 
 
Table A9: 2SLS Estimates of the Cost Function for Military Operations with Alternative Clustering, Division by Day Panel 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable is Estimated Dollar Cost per Day in Millions of 2009 Dollars 

















Km of Progress 2.093 -0.288 8.408 -15.06 8.207 0.423 -27.69 
(by division month) (12.20) (9.057) (9.157) (21.01) (10.50) (4.939) (128.7) 
(by corps month) (14.57) (10.91) (9.966) (21.68) (11.08) (5.667) (166.4) 
(by division) (14.48) (9.913) (8.119) (13.13) (8.943) (4.143) (84.77) 
U.S. Fatalities -1.436 -1.926 -1.428 0.048 -1.475 -1.637 -4.371 
(by division month) (0.583)** (0.625)** (0.768)* (2.464) (0.615)** (0.576)** (12.31) 
(by corps month) (0.764)* (0.856)** (0.854)* (2.803) (0.668)** (0.600)** (15.98) 
(by division) (0.679)** (0.631)** (0.637)** (1.661) (0.515)** (0.422)** (8.156) 
R2 -71.78 -114.1 -110.9 -3,003 -65.24 -13.28 -4,062 
N (Division Days) 4,430 4,107 3,689 1,064 598 3,832 
Corps Months 226 204 215 136 54 204 
Divisions 63 60 47 19 10 61 
  Panel B: Division Days in Which U.S. KIA ≥ 5 
Km of Progress 6.955 -18.58 -80.49 7.891 33.66 -0.846 -22.39 
(by division month) (7.509) (27.46) (338.1) (8.692) (94.89) (11.65) (95.47) 
(by corps month) (7.966) (27.94) (350.2) (8.688) (89.54) (11.61) (142.2) 
(by division) (7.952) (24.24) (290.3) (3.774)** (63.05) (11.77) (89.81) 
U.S. Fatalities -0.711 -4.673 -14.48 -0.014 2.068 -4.956 -4.849 
(by division month) (1.202) (4.587) (53.23) (1.141) (10.44) (5.268) (15.15) 
(by corps month) (1.384) (4.712) (55.18) (1.348) (9.982) (5.416) (22.94) 
(by division) (1.256) (4.241) (46.88) (1.094) (6.843) (3.995) (14.28) 
R2 -80.23 -766.6 -11,997 -1,940 -981.4 -42.24 -3,140 
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (Division Days) 4,579 4,395 3,841 922 621 3,958 
Corps Months 224 204 216 126 65 194 
Divisions 64 61 49 18 10 62 
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Table A10: 2SLS Estimates of the Cost Function for Military Operations with Alternative Clustering, 
Engagement Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (8) (10) (12) 
Dependent Variable is Estimated Cost per Day in Millions of 2009 Dollars 
Panel A: Mission Effectiveness Measured as Km Progress 
Excluded Instruments are Indicators for 
Armored, Post-Reorganization*Infantry, 
and Post-Reorganization*Armored 
Excluded Instruments are U.S. Troops, 
U.S. Tanks, and U.S. Troops * U.S. Tanks 
Variable 










Km of Progress -1,411 558.1 -721.6 21.73 48.58 279.6 1,051 -961.2 
(by engagement) (3,449) (594.2) (1,425) (58.19) (1,220) (127.9)** (2,009) (2,265) 
(by division) (3,277) (717.9) (1,248) (56.86) (992.0) (90.14)** (1,812) (2,611) 
U.S. Fatalities 2.571 -0.833 -0.595 -0.080 4.721 0.286 6.942 4.727 
(by engagement) (13.61) (1.414) (1.833) (0.178) (7.808) (1.006) (17.58) (12.46) 
(by division) (11.54) (1.272) (2.512) (0.191) (9.280) (0.805) (12.41) (14.79) 
R2 -278.9 -36.93 -55.44 0.182 -178.4 -24.9 -491.6 -486.1 
Panel B: Mission Effectiveness Measured with Zero to One Index 
Zero to One 
Index 2,995 -760.4 2,296 4,053 578.0 5,487 7,194 13,757 
(by engagement) (872.7)** (2,570) (925.9)** (1,562)** (13,561) (10,558) (4,246)* (9,711) 
(by division) (1,045)** (3,366) (1,171)* (1,259)** (11,275) (14,033) (4,489) (12,360) 
U.S. Fatalities 0.422 -1.270 -0.309 -0.142 4.506 -1.468 -0.035 -1.505 
(by engagement) (1.251) (1.696) (0.592) (0.379) (12.12) (4.114) (1.823) (3.879) 
(by division) (1.458) (2.736) (0.763) (0.399) (12.40) (5.372) (1.634) (4.978) 
Controls Include . . . 
Date & 
Continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sorties & Enemy Inputs Yes 
Terrain & Weather Yes 
Human Factors Yes 
R2 -4.094 -10.64 -2.070 -3.443 -163.7 -69.54 -15.08 -126.5 
N (Division 
Days) 279  279  279  279  289  150  139  225 
Divisions 19 19  19  19  20  13  16  15 
Notes to Table A10: This table reproduces estimates from Table 2 but with varying ways of clustering the standard 




Notes to Table A11: This table explores the sensitivity of the results by showing alternative specifications of the regressions in Table 2.  Additional details in the 
text.
Table A11: 2SLS Estimates of the Cost Function for Military Operations with Alternative Specifications, Engagement Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Panel A: Mission Effectiveness Measured as Km Progress 
Excluded Instruments are Indicators for Armored, Post-Reorganization*Infantry, and 




Excluding Cases with 
U.S. as Defender 
Excluding Cases with 








Excluding Cases with 
U.S. as Defender 
Excluding Cases with 






Km of  74.22 30.29 47.54 37.98 77.26 42.12 73.31 -338.8 -492.9 -440.4 -807.6 -406.6 -1,591 -19.76 
Progress (68.44) (54.53) (56.00) (56.69) (73.59) (56.27) (69.88) (361.6) (547.5) (379.5) (1,037) (417.1) (4,208) (116.1) 
U.S. Fatalities -0.386 -0.015 -0.538 -0.149 -0.744 -0.189 -0.400 -3.344 -2.117 -4.103 -5.477 -2.433 -8.367 -1.261 
(0.170)** (0.169) (0.196)** (0.205) (0.222)** (0.255) (0.183)** (2.904) (3.266) (3.783) (8.786) (2.078) (23.92) (0.670)* 
R2 -0.105 0.294 -0.134 0.169 -0.853 0.147 -0.107 -26.88 -24.49 -37.29 -95.25 -23.12 -349.5 -2.432 
Panel B: Mission Effectiveness Measured with Zero to One Index 
Index 2,578 3,101 1,913 3,093 1,045 2,506 2,608 3,064 5,161 3,029 3,479  3,756 7,322  3,197 
of Success (753.8)** (935.5)** (790.6)** (1,163)** (673.4)** (761.1)** (769.5)** (1,571)* (1,511)** (1,266)** (1,068)** (1,884)** (3,132)** (1,317) 
U.S. Fatalities -0.626 -0.421 -0.717 -0.616 -0.842 -0.615 -0.618 -1.227 -0.386 -0.664 -0.332 -0.838 -0.270 -1.087 
(0.202)** (0.270) (0.223)** (0.333)* (0.206)** (0.272)** (0.208)** (0.783) (0.926) (0.686) (1.063) (0.431)* (0.723) (0.640)* 
Controls Include . . . 
Date & 
Continent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Air & Enemy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Terr & Weath Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Human Fact Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 -1.001 -1.487 -0.734 -2.031 -0.529 -1.184 -0.986 -3.980 -4.969 -1.657 -2.085 -2.734 -8.832 -3.421 
Division Days 279  279  251  251  234  234  278  289  289  252  252  239  239  288  
Engagements 152 152 140 140 131 131 151 162  162  141  141  136  136  161  
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Table A12: Data Sources for U.S. Military Deaths in Division by Day Panel 
Dataset Sample Variables Source Citation 
Reading 
Room Data 
Battle dead among 
those assigned to 
U.S. Army ground 
divisions. N=146,431 
Name, serial number, division,  
battalion or regiment, rank, broad 
military occupational category, type 
















Battle and non-battle 
dead among those 
assigned to U.S. 
airborne divisions, 
attachments included.  
N=9,209 
Name, division, battalion or regiment, 
company, rank, type of death, country 










captured, or missing, 
battle or non-battle, 
all U.S. military 
branches, 1941-1943, 
N=101,353 
Name, serial number, home county, 
rank, broad category of military 












All battle and non-
battle dead, all U.S. 
military branches, 
N=373,218 
Name, serial number, rank, branch of 











All battle and non-
battle dead buried in 
U.S. military 
cemeteries, all U.S. 
military branches, 
N=180,735 
Name, serial number, branch of 
service, divisional and 
battalion/regiment affiliation, rank, 
type of death, date of death, date of 
birth, age, home town, burial plot 













All dead and missing 
whose remains were 
not recovered by 
1954, all U.S. 
military branches, 
N=79,021 
Name, serial number, rank, branch of 










Nearly all enlisted 
U.S. Army personnel 
who enrolled between 
1938 and 1946, 
N=8,706,394 
Name, serial number, home state and 
county, enlistment location, date of 
enlistment, rank, branch of service, 
term of enlistment, country of birth, 
year of birth, race and citizenship, 
education, civilian occupation, marital 





















Two-way tabulations include different 
types of casualties and deaths by 













Table A13: Estimated Costs for a 1942 Organic Infantry and Armored Division 
Infantry Armored 
 Initial Monthly Initial Monthly 
(expressed in millions of 2009 dollars) 
Enlisted & Officer Pay $233.45 $14.71 $236.33 $14.51
Enlisted & Officer Training $145.13 $0.19 $197.27 $0.31
Major Divisional Equipment $119.80 $4.30 $1,114.84 $71.00
Food $82.72 $3.27 $77.05 $3.08
Clothing $58.02 $2.77 $54.35 $2.14
Additional Equipment $36.40 $3.55 $34.17 $3.92
Ammunition $19.65 $7.98 $22.40 $19.24
Gasoline $2.97 $1.25 $4.29 $3.85
Transportation $280.18 $4.35 $500.10 $11.29
Total $978.34 $42.36 $2,240.78 $129.35
 
Notes to Table A13: Compiled from various archival sources.  Based on 1942 Tables of 
Organization and Equipment.  In 1942, a standard infantry division included 15,514 troops and 0 
tanks.  In 1942, a standard armored division included 14,620 troops and 390 tanks.  
Transportation includes inter- and intra-continental transport costs for troops and equipment. 
 
 
